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Conservation in America is practiced largely by state and federal governm ent This
governm ental strategy began in the Progressive Era o f the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As
the 20th century progressed, local people and conservationists began experimenting with
voluntary agreements such as hunting leases and conservation easements. This form of
conservation, based on voluntary agreement, gives local people a w ay to bargain with public
conservationists. My study proposes that local people always find a w ay to advance their
interests by such bargaining. Furthermore, if bargaining is to lead to agreement, the bargainers
m ust have a trusting relationship. I call this bargaining conservation strategy, Market
Conservation. M y study was made possible by the Boone and Crockett Club. As the Club's
founders, especially Theodore Roosevelt, led the United States into the Progressive Era and the
governm ental m odel o f conservation, so the current members have set ou t to lead the w ay toward
a second m odel. The Boone and Crockett W ildlife Conservation Program at the University o f
Montana connects wildlife biology with other specialties to make interdisciplinary studies of
conservation possible.
I used history, property-rights analysis, and ethnography to build a "thick description" of
voluntary agreements in conservation. Thick description associates meanings, usually gathered
from personal interviews, with events. By taking three view s — through history, property-rights
analysis, and ethnography —I "triangulated" on the subject of interest according to guidelines
found in the literature on qualitative analysis.
In arranging voluntary agreements, people try to: (1) protect immeasurable values by
protecting or managing surrogate values that are inexpensive to measure; (2) share the risk o f
ecosystem dynam ics that can destroy conservation values; and, (3) negotiate a balance between
local and national interests in land and wildlife. I defined 9 types o f agreem ent
The combination o f individual agreements and com m unity-wide acceptance of
conservation m akes a local arrangement for conservation of endangered species. These local
arrangements are struggling to form within constraints imposed by the formal arrangements
codified in law s such as the Endangered Species A c t This presents the policy challenge of
allow ing local people to experiment with local arrangements while still protecting the national
interest in endangered species conservation.

ii
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Preface
The professional audience addressed by m ost wildlife science dissertations is not expert
on the topic o f voluntary agreements because they are not the people "doing" them. Therefore, I
have opted not to write in the usual style o f a professional dissertation. This paper is not
organized in sections of Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion, and neither is it sanitized
of personal view s and details. Yet I kept the purpose of writing a functional paper. The inclusive
style and personality serve the purposes of (1) making these ideas accessible to the widest
audience; and (2) including suppositions of what the data may mean, which is necessary in theory
building.
There were many moments in this study o f doubt and breakthrough. Einstein said the
alternations o f confidence and misgivings are known only to those w ho have experienced them.
Only I know w hat it was like, but I could not have done it without help. In every step of progress
I wondered how I jumped that last cold wall. Beveridge (1957), writing about the art of science,
I

calls it magic. I attribute it to Hal Salwasser, Dan Pletscher, Mike Mattison, and Charlene

f

Schildwachter —w ho pushed me when I got stuck to put my thoughts into words or pictures.

|

Other breakthroughs, though, seemed to come from nowhere. I think the prayers and good

\

intentions o f those w ho supported me in this project created a forward mom entum that

I

eventually overpowered the obstacles. I thank these supporters, know ing the only possible

I

repayment is to pass on the same encouragement to others. I consider this a work in progress, the

I

guts o f a book, and though I did my best to polish it in the time allow ed, I claim all its

I

shortcomings.

;

Other people made this work both possible and fun. I thank the members of the Boone

f

and Crockett Club for their vision and commitment to conservation in funding and supporting

|

the W ildlife Conservation Program. I thank my committee members for their contributions:

|

Terry Anderson, for his enlightening skill of critical analysis and for funding m y first paper on

[.

voluntary agreements; Jon Driessen, for teaching m e the skills of a naturalist that were left out of

\

£

my natural science curriculum; Jim Burchfield, for invigorating discussions about innovations
!

and the sociology of forestry; Bob Knight, for his sharp interest in getting things done, a constant
reminder that this project must be practical. Also, I thank Jim Riley of Intermountain Forest
Industry Association for giving me time to finish this project as I began working for him.
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i
In the Summer of 1992,1 was half-way through a stu d y o f red-wolf reintroduction in
eastern Tennessee, and I read a newspaper article entitled "Wolves in the Marketplace." The
article described h ow Hank Fischer o f Defenders of Wildlife w as paying ranchers in Montana
$5,000 when gray w olves denned successfully on their ranch. In Tennessee, I w as thinking about
how landowners surrounding Great Smoky Mountains National Park could be persuaded to
tolerate the red w olves that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service w as releasing there and that would
certainly range beyond the park's boundaries. At the sam e time, m y advisor at the University of
Tennessee, Mike Pelton, was helping a group of landowners, timber companies, public agencies,
private conservation and environmental groups, and other scientists form the Black Bear
Conservation Committee. This committee intended to restore the Louisiana black bear, which
was likely to becom e an officially endangered species.
Sensing an explanation that ties together this group o f happenings, I began studying
these voluntary agreements. The Red W olf Recovery Program w as a new type of endangered
species work done by the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service: the Service accommodated concerns of
local people about restrictions placed in their community to protect the red wolf. The Service was
1
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able to relax som e restrictions through special rules that m ade the red wolves "nonessential" and
"experimental." Defenders o f Wildlife also was accommodating local concerns about an
endangered wolf, but in a different way. Defenders w as in a market, but no one was claim ing
ownership of the w olves. The Black Bear Conservation Committee was addressing local concerns
by visiting landowners and explaining their restoration plan. Som e of those visits to landowners
with concerns about bears ended up with the landowner donating money to the Committee.
Voluntary agreements are evidence o f a departure in conservation from the dom inant
role of state and federal government agencies. The label, "Governmental Conservation"
describes the publicly administered bureaucracy that governs m ost conservation work. "Market
Conservation" describes the growing practice of conservation by local people bargaining and
reaching agreement am ong themselves and with public agents about how projects will be done.

Purpose
My purpose is to describe the development o f Market Conservation and suggest how
j

conservationists and landowners can experiment with it by seeking voluntary agreements with

f
t
I

each other. I do this by stating my hypothesis for w hy Defenders o f Wildlife is paying ranchers

I

species. This tentative explanation is, in short, that local people w ill always find a way to

I
s
I

influence conservation decisions with their view of the costs and benefits of those decisions. The
history of conservation show s how people asserted their interests and then how the building of

§

Governmental Conservation constrained local interests on behalf o f the national interest (Chapter

and why the Black Bear Conservation Committee wrote the recovery plan for a threatened

*»•

I

2). In the rest of the paper, I support my hypothesis w ith 48 case studies showing how

|

conservationists and landowners have reached agreements. Chapter 3 reports the skills and steps

i

f

they go through to reach agreement. Chapter 4 reports the economic details of their agreements.

!

In Chapter 5 , 1 argue that conservation overall w ill im prove if policy embraces my specific

j

recommendations to create forums and favorable conditions for landowners and conservationists

i

;

to reach voluntary agreements. Throughout the paper, I illustrate constraints on reaching

<

agreement im posed by the current policies of Governmental Conservation.
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Hypothesis and Implication
If local people are excluded from or relegated in conservation decisions, they will find a
w ay to advance their interests by bargaining. Bargaining leads to agreem ent if the bargainers
have a trusting relationship. The policies com posing Governmental Conservation ignore values
people have for natural resources (economic, social, and cultural) and usurp local rights (legal
and de facto). People are finding ways to bargain for these values in whatever legal or de facto
ways they can find or create. This bargaining is Market Conservation. W hen landowners and
conservationists can develop trust and relationship, they reach agreement (see Chapter 3). Their
agreement will match one o f at least 9 types (see chapter 4). Whether the agreem ent manifests in
a legal document - a contract - depends on transaction costs, culture, laws, and other constraints
(see chapter 4).
When local interests are recognized and included and when the conservationists develop
trust and relationship with local people, people are more comfortable with decisions. Whether
Market Conservation produces acceptable progress in sustaining or restoring resources is yet to
be seen. (I believe, by definition, a voluntary agreement produces acceptable results, but som e
>
i

people w ill accept nothing short of their ow n personal preference for the condition of resources.)
My hypothesis implies that the tension in conservation issues arises from local people
struggling to find a place to represent their interest and non-local people concerned that their
interests will be g iven away. We can probably ease this tension if w e create a forum where
people can negotiate local and national interests. Where an issue pertains m ainly to private land,
the best forum likely is the personal relationship between a field conservationist and a private
landowner. Where the issue pertains mainly to a wildlife species or a tract of public land, the best
forum likely is the relationship among members of a collaborative group. I will suggest ways
both these fora can be created and encouraged.

(
j

|

Methods

£

j

To develop m y hypothesis and test it against instances of voluntary agreements, I took a
naturalist's approach. I found and recorded factually and realistically the circumstances o f
agreement in everyday life. I did not try to isolate parts of everyday life, as a scientist
instinctively w ould, because I wanted to draw practical observations that could be applied by
practicing conservationists. To isolate an economic, social, or ecological part o f agreement would
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4

have given conservationists some conclusion that w as useful only in isolated cases. On the other
hand, I used m ethods from each of these disciplines so I had a thorough view of everyday life
(H g -1).
To com bine economic, sociological, and ecological data in a study is called triangulation
(Denzin 1970). The term was adapted metaphorically from navigation and surveying. Denzin's
(1970:xii) definition is "the combination of m easurem ent strategies ... for resolving the inherent
biases o f on e measurement technique" or, sim ply, the use o f "multiple methods o f observation"
(Denzin 1970:26). I felt it is important to know w hat voluntary agreements look like
econom ically, but having a contract in hand leaves the conservationist to figure out h o w to
contact a landowner, and overcome the suspicion that the landowner probably has, and g et on
track to negotiating an agreem ent Likewise, know ing the sociological part of the problem leaves
out the contract. "Sociological reality is such that no single method, theory, or observer can ever
capture all that is relevant and important" (Denzin 1970:xii).
Very little systematically collected ecological data are available to describe the ecological
results o f voluntary agreements. I gathered historical information from secondary sources and
analyzed them using "A Guide for Critical Thinking about Natural Resource Case Studies"
t
f
jt
|

(Salwasser 1994). The economic and sociological data I collected were interviews and docum ents.
Contracts, brochures, and other documents allow ed m e to describe the economic elem ents o f

|

describe the m eanings behind these artifacts as expressed by the people who use them. I

I

analyzed the stories with ethnographic methods. I describe these methods in detail as they com e

I

up in the follow in g chapters.

agreements through property-rights analysis. Interviews provided the stories that allow ed m e to

r:
11,
I

*'■
|

£

Justifying A Naturalist's Approach
I u sed no statistical inference, but relied on observation and induction, which draw s on
the roots o f w ild life science. Darwin, for exam ple, observed and induced.

!

Naturalistic approaches may lead to discovery of statistically valid associations, but until
w e have a preliminary theory about the phenom enon, statistical hypothesis-testing is premature.
Nevertheless, m y naturalistic approach may appear unscientific to some; therefore, here is a
justification.
Science is an attempt to make statements about the world that anyone can replicate,
whereas art is a deliberate attempt to state som ething from a personal perspective (O'Hear 1995).
My v iew of history', and what I hear in an interview, and how I classify agreements is not
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Fig. 1. Schematic map o f intellectual disciplines and interdisciplinary
thought pertinent to im proving endangered species recovery.
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replicable, but neither is it deliberately personal. It is in between, and that is the realm of the
naturalist.
Naturalistic science — relying on observation, induction, invention, and intuition — is the
first and m ost basic scientific discipline. Biologists, acting as naturalists, relied on induction in
the m iddle decades of this century as they developed criteria for sex and age of wildlife
(Dimmick and Pelton 1994). For exam ple, one of the most common skills of biologists, estimating
the age o f white-tailed deer, is based on the examination of numerous jawbones (Severinghaus
1949). These techniques are no longer the most accurate, but they were the mainstay of research
and management until replaced by new techniques.
The most influential theory in the natural sciences was also induced from an observed
database. Charles Darwin "returned after a voyage of five years with a firsthand know ledge of
geology and zoology ... and ... the germinal ideas of his theory of evolution" (Eliot 1909:5).
Darwin him self described his work as the success of "unbounded patience in long reflecting over
m y subject — industry in observing and collecting facts - and a fair share of invention as w ell as
o f com mon sense" (Eliot 1909:8). Naturalistic science is also found in physics. Einstein said,
"There is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the w ay of
j

s

intuition, which is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance" (Einstein 1933).

f

The need for induction, invention, and intuition in science is not, however, a license for

\

creative writing. Darwin and the others saw the need to present for review the data from which

i

j

they built their theories. "No one can feel more sensible than I do o f the necessity o f hereafter

i

publishing in detail all the facts, with references, on which my conclusions have been grounded"

|

(Darwin 1859:22). The value in having others review the data of a naturalistic study is to sharpen

(

the researcher's eye for "the order lying behind the appearance."

i

I
j

A Search, Not a Sample
Using a technique called snowball sampling (Strauss and Corbin 1990), I m oved

|

deliberately from one story about an agreement to another, usually asking people involved to

|

help me find another case of agreement. I searched; I did not sample. The result is 48 cases of
agreement representing numerous documents and 27 interviews. Later in the paper, I call the
interviewees "members" because they all belong to the population of people who know how to
reach agreement about conservation on private land. This group of people does not represent a
sam ple of the views about reaching agreement in the statistical sense. Statistically speaking, a
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sample is a subset of a population drawn randomly or by som e design to represent the
population.

Capsule of Findings
Governmental Conservation: Analysis, Planning, and Centralized Power
During the frontier era in American history, resources were open to taking by anyone and
the resources dwindled: a scenario known as the "tragedy o f the commons" (Hardin 1968).
People responded by lim iting access to the com m ons. Authority for limiting access was vested in
state and national government. Under this regime, bureaucrats allocated resources by believing
in "the gospel of efficiency" (Hays 1959) and responding to special interests. Efficiency prompted
rational-comprehensive planning schemes. Influence worked by relationships among the
bureaucrats, Congressional staffs, and interest groups that resulted in "contracts" allocating
values. Relationships leading to "contracts" also w ere shared by local agents o f Governmental
Conservation, such as forest rangers, game wardens, and local citizens. H owever, as resources
I
l
1

became scarcer, more and broader interests dem anded a share of the values. Ultimately this led

|

scientific rules of Governmental Conservation.

I

to laws and regulations that constrained local (native) officials and forced more reliance of

Under the central organization of Governmental Conservation, bureaucrats attempt to

j:

enlarge the budget of their programs and retain authority in allocating that budget (Cubbage et

I

al. 1993). Decentralizing power, by enabling more local decisions, is painful for the power-

jj

brokers in public office and interest groups. All experience says that decentralized organizations
work better, but political appointees continue to act to centralize power.

r-

[

;

In Conservation, People Negotiate Local and National Interests
Whereas the public lands and wildlife are h eld in trust by state and federal government

|

on behalf of the entire nation, these resources are particularly interesting to the local people who

i

live in their midst and rely on som e of these for their econom ic well-being. Recognizing the local

■

interest in public resources, Gifford Pinchot directed forest rangers to become part of their

?

communities. Later, the Forest Service and other agencies became concerned that local agents
who have "gone native" were cutting deals against the national interest. Agencies then began
m oving agents more frequently, prohibiting them from going native. Also, law s were passed that
established cumbersome processes for publicizing and gathering comments on the activities of
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public agencies. The National Environmental Policy Act is the primary o f such laws. The Federal
Advisory Com m ittee Act is another such law. Because people can file lawsuits challenging
agencies' adherence to the processes required by these laws, agency conservationists can be
inhibited in dealing w ith local people (see pp. 37).
People reaching voluntary agreements today try to balance the local and national
interests w ithin rules established to protect the national interest This finding is introduced in
Chapter 2 and discussed in Chapters 3 ,4 , and 5.

Local Conservationists Rely on Trust and Relationship
Voluntary agreements today result from relationships am ong public agents, local
conservationists, and landowners. Conservationists have learned to build relationships and
establish trust in com m unities so that agreement is possible. M oving from these relationships
into circum stances in that com munity, and then to specific terms of an agreem ent requires a
know ledge o f the interests and concerns of landowners. I report these stages in Chapter 3.
Agreem ents use the sam e science em ployed by Governmental Conservation, but local
people a p p ly this know ledge secondarily to building the relationships that base their bargaining.
I

Once the bargaining relationship is underway, people apply the facts and findings of science to

A

\

the agreem ent they are trying to reach. There are face-to-face encounters here that

:

conservationists and landowners need to Ieam to do.

Market Conservation Results in at Least 9 Types of Agreement
Agreem ents that are reached take 9 main forms. The types are: (1) Registry; (2) Reward
and Compensation; (3) Lease; (4) Cost-share; (5) Easement; (6) Franchise; (7) Private
Management; (8) Exemptions; and, (9) Working Together and Miscellany. These types can be
modified or used to define n ew types. These details are presented in Chapter 4.

j

Costs Constrain Voluntary Agreements

[

A ssu m ing conservationists and landowners establish sufficient trust and relationship,

;

and assum ing they overcom e the constraints in place to protect the national interest, they must
face the costs o f reaching agreem ent and carrying out conservation practices. These costs arise
from: (1) finding trading partners, (2) defining and measuring rights o f trade, and (3) ecosystem
dynam ics that destroy conservation values.
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Voluntary Agreements Need a Forum
N o w w e have returned to a setting where public agents are faced with bargaining but
now they are constrained by the rules o f Governmental Conservation that developed since
Gifford Pinchot urged his forest rangers to "go native." Local conservationists and landowners
are struggling to reach agreement within constraints imposed by the formal arrangements
codified in law s such as the Endangered Species A ct This presents the policy challenge of
allow ing local people to experiment with local arrangements w hile still protecting the national
interest in endangered species. This finding is reached in Chapter 5.

Conclusion
Market Conservation will develop further as local people are enabled to reach durable
agreements and if these agreements lead to protected and improved w ildlife habitats and
populations. To enable local people and conservationists, w e m ust temper legal constraints such
as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the threat of
litigation. Supervisors of local conservationists need to stop evaluating job performance solely in
terms o f acres treated or ecological conditions improved, and begin measuring the ability of local
conservationists to become trusted members of their communities. This entails allowing time to
local conservationists to be available in communities for chance encounters, to join community
events, and to work with local people on small projects. In som e cases, local cultures will need to
change: receiving payments to protect gray wolves on private property w ill need to become
acceptable just as charging hunters for access has had to.
My recommendations (Chapter 5, draft pp. 77-79) will help conservationists and
landowners experiment with Market Conservation. The value o f their agreements to the
conservation movement w ill be seen in retrospect, when land, water, fish, and wildlife have had
time to respond to conservation work done by voluntary agreement.
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In Fall 1993, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service dispatched federal game wardens to their
Austin, Texas, office to investigate a large number of reports that landowners were illegally
clearing land that w as habitat for golden-cheeked warblers (Dendroica chrysoparia) and blackcapped vireos (Vireo atricapilla) (Bantz 1993). In another place and time, about a century earlier,
in 1886, a troop of the First Cavalry arrived at the 14-year-old Yellowstone Park to begin
"roaming the back trails and canyons, flushing out hunters, woodcutters, and souvenir collectors"
(Trefethen 1975:79). Like any armed police action, these were tense for the people involved.
Wyoming in 1886 and Texas in 1993 are cases of growing pains in American
conservation: tense moments that marked the birth of new conservation strategies. The strategy
developed after the Yellowstone incident is Governmental Conservation, which is the system of
federal and state agencies, public lands, and the laws and regulations by which they are
managed. This, along with the non-govemmental organizations, is conservation as w e know it in
America. Tension over endangered species issues such as the exam ple from Texas marks the

10
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forming o f a new strategy, Market Conservation. This approach depends on local people
reaching agreements to protect and restore endangered species and other natural resources.
The fundamental chronology of American conservation show s that local people find
w ays to influence conservation with their v iew o f costs and benefits (Fig. 2). Economic concepts
such as property rights and social cost played a role. Political leadership of Progressive
politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt also influenced this history. Evolving scientific ideas
helped m ove conservationists from protecting to producing w ildlife, and changed our view of
nature as a machine to nature as a living being, adapting to conditions. These and other factors
have brought landowners and conservationists into personal relationships where they reconcile
their rival interests in resources. The follow ing chapters describe these relationships that relieve
the tensions.

Competition for the Commons: 1600s - 1930s
The decision to hold wildlife as com m on property is a defining feature of American
conservation history from European immigration in the 1600s to the 1930s. This decision brought
the risk o f a "tragedy of the commons" and set up a rivalry between the interests in wildlife held
|

by all Americans everywhere and the interests o f local Americans living in the midst of the

|

w ildlife and other resources.

|

Free from royalty that had excluded them from wildlife in Europe, and in the midst of an

I

abundance of w ildlife such as they had never seen, European immigrants to North America

|

hunted and fished freely to sustain themselves. Wildlife began to decline fairly quickly: local

|

ordinances limiting the killing of deer began in the 1600s (Leopold 1933). This scenario fits what

|

Hardin (1968) called the "tragedy of the commons" and shows how that tragedy is prevented or

!

averted.

B

•

The "tragedy o f the commons" is that people w ill not maintain or enhance a resource that

f

is open for all to use; the solution is "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).

|

W ildlife, by definition, is free to roam; therefore, no one can control access to it. Every person

I
1
‘

living in the m idst of the wildlife can try to capture som e of it. N o one invests in maintaining the
w ildlife because their investment would be lost to whoever reaps the benefit before they do.
Hardin (1968) extrapolates this scenario to its tragic end: a resource useful to everyone is
exhausted because everyone uses it but no one maintains it. The only w ay out is for the users to
agree am ong them selves to limit their use. They coerce each other by mutual agreement.
Game ordinances in the 1600s were the first step of mutual coercion agreed to by the new
Americans. After restrictive ordinances cam e governmental agencies. People realized that
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Fig. 2. Fundamental Chronology Leading to Voluntary Agreements

1600s

Local people compete for wildlife; "tragedy of the
commons" looms; property rigjhts for wildlife are not
established
U.S. creates federal agencies to protect the national
public interest in wildlife.
• National interest formalized as "Governmental
Conservation" run by a central bureaucracy of
techrrically-trainedresource specialists and funded
by taxes.
• Relationships with local people are discouraged
• Nature Conservancy begins deeding in real
estate market for conservation purposes.
■ Economists rethink social cost and tragedy of
the commons.
• Market Conservation begins developing.

1970s

Endangered Species Act passes.
Limits of Governmental Conservation
when local interests are excluded
Endangered Species Act
amended to include some local
interests.
Voluntary agreements become
popular, Market Conservation
enters formative stage.
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limiting access to wildlife, especially wild fisheries, was hard to administer. It was hard to ensure
equitable opportunities because fish-harvesters could strategically place nets and effectively
eliminate another person's chance to catch fish. Also, som e state governm ents shared access to
rivers and other bodies of water which raised the question of who held superior authority. These
problems m otivated the establishment of the first federal agency in fish or w ildlife management:
the U.S. Fish Comm ission established in 1871.
Forming federal commissions did not solve all problems with managing wildlife, but it
founded the governmental strategy and established a national interest in w ildlife and natural
resources. National interest is the right, claim, or legal share to w ildlife and natural resources
that American citizens hold, and that the governmental agencies represent. Individual citizens,
or communities, have been required since the beginning of Governmental Conservation to clear
their use of w ildlife and natural resources with all other Americans.
Although the common-property nature of wildlife was the driving force toward
Governmental Conservation, other factors played a role and helped define h ow Governmental
Conservation works. During the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), interpretations of
the Constitution by the Supreme Court began setting legal precedent for governm ent to interfere
'

with individual action (Anderson and Hill 1980). A political ideology known as Progressivism

t
ic.
H

developed and - am ong its other objectives of trust-busting and dethroning "robber barons" -

|

calculations that divided land-management values equitably by professionally trained specialists

I

in the Executive bureaucracy. The Progressives changed the Executive branch from a passive

I

affirmer of policies made by Congress into a technically skilled developer o f policy. Efficiency

E
t;

was possible, in part, because interests in land were divisible: amounts o f land, water, timber,

P

and other com m odities could be divided and distributed.

|
k'

pushed a "gospel of efficiency" in land management (Hays 1959). Efficiency was the goal of

Private ownership of wildlife and resources - the alternative to public ownership - was
considered, but the only property right imaginable at the time was in physical control of land and

I

wildlife (Tober 1981). In addition, the costs of establishing ownership to the amenity values of

r

,

land and w ildlife were prohibitive. In short, neither the political nor econom ic conditions for the

\

evolution o f property rights over wildlife were in place.

;

The scientific understanding of wildlife management is the closing point on this first
phase of history. Leopold (1933) wrote the first text on the subject. H e reported that concepts of
game management evolved in history from protection of stocks to m anaging the ecological factors
on which those stocks depend. His definition of game management marked the transition in
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America from a mostly protective strategy to one that would "produce annual crops." In the next
phase of history, American conservationists worked to do just that.

Governmental Conservation: 1930s - 1970s
In the 1930s, the final pieces of Governmental Conservation were placed.
Combined with Congressional "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States" (U.S.
Constitution IV §3), .the Progressives had institutionalized a system of public land overseen by an
executive bureaucracy. America's investment in education through land-grant universities was
producing professionally-trained resource managers. These managers were organizing
them selves into professional societies like The Wildlife Society, founded in 1937. Taxes were the
main means of funding conservation. The Migratory Bird Stamp Act (1934) and the Federal Aid
in Wildlife Restoration Acts (1937 and 1950) created a financial base for much of the game
management for waterfowl and restoration of white-tailed deer (Odocoileiis virginianus) and other
gam e species.
j
|

Interest groups had been forming since 1875 (American Forestry Association), and
continued to organize as the first conservation model formed. "Power clusters" (Behan 1977) or
"iron triangles" (Cubbage et al. 1993) developed as these groups built relationships with members
of Congressional and agency staffs. These clusters created a powerful role for small groups or
minorities. Especially in technical issues, agency specialists, lobbyists, and Congressional staff
together become the experts, thus limiting substantive debate to a small group. Hays (1959)
described the Progressive leaders of conservation as such a minority. The political battles among

i

the minorities lobbying for their interests began as early as 1924, w hen the magazine Outlook
criticized the U.S. Forest Service for over-emphasizing recreation over forestry (Carhart 1962).

t:

£

Governmental Conservation was also marked by policies that prevented local agents

j

from "going native." A s representatives of the public interest in valuable natural resources, and

I

also as residents in local communities, these agents walked the line where local and national
interests meet. To som e extent, federal agencies moved their local representatives frequently to
prevent them from becom ing too sympathetic to local interests and therefore too lenient in
controlling the use of public resources. Kaufman (1960:218) put it this way:
The practice of transferring men rapidly, particularly in the early stages
of their careers, also counterbalances the danger of their being 'captured' by the
communities in which they live and work. To be sure, the Forest Service
encourages its men to recognize and understand the concerns of their
communities, and to take part in community affairs. But there have been
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instances in which the utility of a good forest officer has been gravely reduced
because he became so enmeshed in local affiars that he could not properly
discharge his reponsibilities as a representative o f the agency and the agency's
view of the public interest
Peterson and Speth (1982:13) describe in detail the problem early forest rangers had in
being "a promoter and educator [of conservation] and ... a policeman." This "created tension and
confusion," Peterson and Speth (1982:13) go on to say, and represents a battle as old as the
colonial struggle for self rule and as new as the Sagebrush Rebellion. Part o f the difficulty was in
the inability of anyone to divide the uses of public land in any w ay other than through a public
decision-maker such as a ranger. Events of mid-century, however, began to rem ove that barrier
as The Nature Conservancy formed and Ronald Coase began devising new w ays to apply market
principles.

The Beginnings of Market Conservation: 1950s - 1960s
The birth o f Market Conservation as an alternative to Government Conservation began in
the practical work of The Nature Conservancy and the theoretical work of Coase (1960). Ronald
*
f
\

Coase is an econom ist w ho w on the Nobel Prize in 1991. The Nature Conservancy was formed in
1951 by ecologists w ho wanted to apply their skills on private land (T N C 1997). The Conservancy

Vr

£

began dealing in real estate to protect conservation values o f private land. By doing this they

|
r
w

demonstrated a principle that Coase later described. To m y knowledge, there w as no connection

I

|
k
f

between Coase and the Conservancy.
Coase (1960) argued that the costs of pollution (the classic "externality") could be covered
by defining new property rights based on the actual costs perceived by people involved in the

i

r

pollution. That n ew right could be the sufferer's right to clean air, or the polluter's right to

r

|

dispose o f waste. The polluter and the sufferer could strike a deal either by having the polluter

\

pay the sufferers for the right to pollute, or the sufferers could pay for the right to clear air.

1

By 1951, w h en the Conservancy began its work. Governmental Conservation was
operating clearly and som ew hat effectively, creating a "clear tendency in American conservation
to relegate to governm ent all necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform" (Leopold
1949:213).
Government ownership, operation, subsidy, or regulation is n ow w idely
prevalent in forestry, range management, soil and watershed management, park
and w ilderness conservation, fisheries management, and migratory bird
management. Most of this growth in governmental conservation is proper and
logical, som e of it is inevitable (Leopold 1949:213).
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The assumption in m ost people's mind had to be that if private lands harbored som e rare or
beautiful feature, then a governmental program would be the w ay to protect it. That was not the
assumption o f the Conservancy’s founders.
The Conservancy demonstrated Coase's principle o f reciprocity by raising private funds to
buy private property to protect ecological features of land in the public interest. Analogously to
Coase (1960) and the exam ple o f a polluter, a private landow ner w ho intends to destroy a rare or
beautiful feature of his or her land is the polluter. Losing that feature would be a cost to society
as is tolerating pollution. Government could stop the landowner, thereby im posing a cost on the
landowner. On the other hand, the Conservancy decided to im pose the cost on society by raising
private funds to pay the landowner or buy the land.
The econom ic picture today is much different. Land values have risen so high that
Roosevelt's inheritance tax has become, ironically, a threat to conservation (Small 1992). Because
the tax has become expensive to people of common means, families must often sell lands for their
highest market value (small parcels for real-estate developm ent) in order to pay the tax. Also,
people have made land ownership complex by defining m ultiple property rights for a single tract
of land: public lands are leased for specific uses, private lands are "encumbered" with easements
that transfer limited property interests to conservation groups. Lueck (1995) showed that various
rights to land can be held by several parties, and also that landowners with enough land to
encompass the range o f a population can, by controlling access, achieve de facto ownership o f that
population.

Endangered Species Act and Limits of Governmental
I
!
)

Conservation: 1970s - present
The Endangered Species Act laid out a process by w hich specialists w ould analyze the

Sf

£

likelihood that a species could persist and carry out a plan to raise that likelihood. No one

v

[
?

i

=

anticipated the costs.
After the Endangered Species Act became law in 1973, its supporters were surprised by
the lack of rapid listings and delineations of critical habitat T w enty years after passage, the
process still is slow and questionable in effectiveness. Yaffee (1982) concluded that during the 5
years between passage and the first amendments to the A ct in 1978, most proposals for listing
particular species languished in the review process. Similarly, he observed that critical habitats
were designated only under pressure of litigation. More recently, Tear et al. (1993) argued that

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

17

recovery targets are often below scientific opinion of what levels would maximize the chance of
saving the species. The problems with the listing process, according to a Fish and W ildlife
Service assistant regional director quoted by Cohn (1990:22), boil down to, "In a nutshell we're too
busy with other species... We don't have the money or resources to list every species that
deserves it."
Statistics summarize the situation: 3,600 species proposed for listing; about 780 listed;
367 recovery plans approved; and only 18 species removed from the list (6 recovered, 6
disqualified, 6 extinct) (Shank, USFWS, pers. comm. 1993).
The explanation lies in two faulty assumptions: (1) technical definitions exist for central
components of the policy such as endangered status and critical habitat, and; (2) a p olity such as
this, which prohibits certain actions, eliminates discretion among decision-makers in the
implementing agency (Yaffee 1982). In practice, the Fish and Wildlife Service and National
Marine Fisheries Service found room enough within the Act to establish an unstated policy
composed o f 2 themes: delay decisions in the face o f controversy, and act conservatively (i.e.,
minimize the number of species listed and area of critical habitat designated).
There are costs to bureaucratic foot-dragging. Obviously, those favoring the policy were
dissatisfied for lack of progress. Those opposed and indifferent both paid in terms of stress and
financial losses generated by the uncertainty and delay. Other federal agencies, such as the Corps
of Engineers were required to wait on decisions from the Fish and Wildlife Service and National
Marine Fisheries Service to complete consultations on projects. Private individuals w aiting for
permits from the Corps of Engineers were, in turn, delayed, which cost som e of them in interest
payments, idled equipment, and other expenses incurred by delayed projects.
On the macroeconomic scale, the near scuttling o f the Tellico Dam project resulted in the
clear statement of the Supreme Court that "the plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute
was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost" (T.V.A. v. H ill).
On the microeconomic scale, individual landowners have lost values from their land w hen
regulations under the Endangered Species Act precluded them from building on or otherwise
developing all or part of their property: Fitzgerald (1993) describes several cases of this,
including the Off family in the San Joaquin Valley, CA, and the Morian family of Austin, TX.
Many of these "horror stories" have intricate details that authors seem to shuffle according to their
own political view s, but the case law behind the problem of regulating private land is clearing up.
"If a regulation destroys the opportunity to use one or more of the sticks [representing one or
more rights to land], but the remaining sticks give value to the bundle [of sticks] as a w hole, no
taking has occurred" (Duerksen and Roddewig 1994:17-18).
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ESA Amendments of 1982 Open the Door for Local Interests:
1980s - present
Responding to the costs inadvertently imposed on local people. Congress amended the
Act in 1982 to allow otherwise legal activities to proceed, under certain conditions, even if these
activities harmed an endangered species. For example, in reintroducing the red w olf to coastal
North Carolina, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service allowed local hunters and trappers the right to
accidentally kill or trap a red wolf. Hunters and trappers w ould be forgiven their error if they
reported the incident w ithin 24 hours and if investigators agreed it w as an accident.
Also responding to costs imposed on local people, but not waiting for an act of Congress,
Defenders of Wildlife - a non-profit environmental organization - raised m oney with which to
reimburse ranchers for the cost of livestock killed by gray w olves in Montana and Idaho. Upon
determination by a w ildlife biologist that dead stock was killed by w olves. Defenders would pay
the rancher.
[

Defenders was practicing "free-market environmentalism" (Anderson and Leal 1991). The

;

concept is to establish property rights for features of the environm ent and then bargain for them.

«

For example, the value o f gray w olves held by environmentalists w as meaningless to landowners

|

because there was no w ay for the landowner to profit by having w olves around. Defenders found

1

a way to frame a transaction around the fact that the landowner is tolerating, if not supporting,

*

wolves. Through the Defenders program people who value w olves can give landowners an
f

incentive to maintain or enhance the suitability of his or her land for wolves.
Market Conservation comprises more than the "free-market environmentalism" of

|

Anderson and Leal (1991). Free-market environmentalism is based on a world view of people

|

tending toward self-interest, where pertinent knowledge about resources cannot be captured by

|
f
£
f
•

the people in a single governm ent agency or a single company (Anderson and Leal 1991). A

looking-.comfortable w ith a changing world, tolerant, and enthusiastic about market process and

i

individual liberty" (Boaz and Crane 1993:9). Market liberalism adds to free-market

|

related, but larger, concept is "market liberalism," which has been defined as "forward-

environmentalism the social dim ension of a cosmopolitan, inclusive society. This describes the
attitude o f local conservationists and landowners today who are learning to enjoy their
differences. Putting these ideas together, I call today's voluntary agreements, Market
Conservation. I prefer "conservation" to "environmentalism" - although these words can be
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used synonym ously for political reasons - because conservation implies to me judicious use of
resources and environmentalism implies protectionism.

Citizen Management: 1990s - present
As of this writing, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposes to authorize a group of
citizens and agency officials to reintroduce grizzly bears in northern Idaho (USFW S1997). This
plan admits local interests to conservation like no other of w hich I am aware.
D epending on the outcome of the proposal, the C itizen Management Committee could
become a m odel for Market Conservation. To restore the bear, the citizen management
committee m ust negotiate the value of bear habitat and rival uses people have for that sam e land.
For example, if citizens allow forest products companies to harvest so many trees from the forest
that bears can be seen from long distances, then the risk of bears being shot rises. The
relationship betw een tree-density and shooting-risk has not y et been estimated, much less
determined with accuracy. Other values at stake are even harder to describe; for exam ple, how
does the recreational value of the forest change when there is a risk of a grizzly bear nosing into a
|

tent? These values obviously differ am ong local people who w ill live in the m idst o f the bears,

|

and other Americans who w ill enjoy sim ply knowing that bears are back in Idaho. Through a

1

citizen m anagem ent committee, local people will have a direct and mandated authority to assert

i

I

II
I

their values in the decision within the constraints of the National Environmental Policy Act, the
National Forest M anagem ent Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other applicable laws.

Conclusion
This brief and superficial history of forces driving conservation has brought us to a place

I
‘t*

of figuring ou t h ow to arrange conservation voluntarily. This is the setting for the new s of

f

peaceful solutions to conflicts over endangered species conservation. In Louisiana, a group of

t

landowners, agencies, conservation groups, and academics decided to work together as the Black

5

Bear Conservation Committee and wrote a recovery plan that w as adopted by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service for the threatened Louisiana black bear (Ursiis americanus luteolus). In the
Sandhills of North Carolina, a working group of public agencies, conservation interests,
com munity groups, and private landowners developed Safe Harbor, a concept that limits a
landowner’s legal obligation so they feel free to improve the status of red-cockaded woodpeckers
(Picoides borealis) on their land. In Montana, as I mentioned at the start of Chapter 1, Defenders of
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Wildlife is delivering rewards of S5,000 to landowners on whose property endangered gray
wolves den.
The growing number o f cooperative solutions with landowners is an encouragement and
a challenge. It encourages us to believe that people are capable of productive negotiation and
challenges us to understand how it is done so we can do it more often and more effectively.
Concepts of negotiated conservation, or Market Conservation, are only beginning to appear in the
writings o f w ildlife and forestry professionals. Wildlife professionals seem limited to the neo
classical econom ic paradigm (Geist and McTaggart-Cowan 1995, Schildwachter 1996a), but
foresters seem farther along in recognizing ideas such as free-market environmentalism (Cubbage
et al. 1993). Neither foresters nor wildlife professionals have any guidance w id ely available on
using voluntary agreements. This is evident in the writings o f those w ho lament the fact (Maehr
1990) and those who ignore the problems it raises (O'Connell and N oss 1992). In the next
chapters, I explain w h at case studies can teach us about how to reach agreements in conservation.

i
£

i

|

i
£
r

£
r
S
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To begin this chapter, I will get straight to the main point; to reach agreement,
conservationists and landowners m ust accommodate each other's interests, and doing this
requires that they have trusting relationships. After two sections illustrating these conclusions, I
explain how I arrived at them.

Reaching Agreement Means Accommodating Others’ Interests
To understand w hat was happening in cases such as the Black Bear Conservation
Committee and Defenders of Wildlife, I began talking to the people involved. Mostly, they talked
about interests: their rights, claims, and desires, and those of their counterparts. In reaching
agreement, they were accommodating each others' interests.
RF:

"We need a forest out there that can do what everybody needs it to do."

GS:

"The Forest Service was interested in doing their thing on National Forest lands."

JS:

"Oh, I've got to go along with it, I may not like it, but I'll put m y tw ist into it wherever I
can put m y tw ist into it"

GW:

"The difference is being w illing to compromise, using com mon sense and reason."

GW:

"The agenda in m y mind is what I said before, when people com e in set in their ways and
are uncompromising. I question the motivation o f the people w ho filed the petition [to
list the Atlantic salmon as endangered]. I remember something in the paper that if the
Bangor hydro w ould throw out their permit to build the Basins Mill dam, they would
throw out their petition to have this fish listed, which tells m e that they've got an
agenda."

GW:

"Even w hen their w hole life is around the salmon and saving the salmon, and I
understand that, that's what they're paid to do, that’s what they're trained to do, and
that’s w hat they supposed to do. And they need to understand that I am paid and
trained to grow blueberries and make a profit and thats where w e have to understand
that and cooperate."

JS:

"What's their job? Their job is to improve that earth, make it the best obviously and in the
back of everybody minds: recreation. They've got to raise the elk, that's what creates the
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dollars. We just see a little different on wildlife issues. That's his business, his area."

GS:

"We were trying to get guys ((private landowners)) to plant som ething other than crested
wheatgrass."

RF:

"Where our forests were growing to supply our mills ... w e got so restricted so narrowed
in. You know, an eagle's nest, and we can't go within a half mile, w e believe in that, w e ’d
do that, but just the same, all these things are just nipping aw ay and eventually it limits
your ability to do business."

To Reach Agreement Requires Trusting Relationships
Throughout this chapter, the words of people I interview ed make clear that trust and
relationship are necessary for agreement.

Personal Relationships
JM:

"The reason it got started over there is that a lot o f p eople in the wildlife management
districts were already working with farmers. A lot o f our easem ents over there that w e
currently have were started by Partners for W ildlife Projects developing credibility and
trust with the landowners."

GN:

"These relationships, you know, sometimes you get so focused in on doing a project that,
you know, I don't have time to talk to the fisheries guys, I don't have time to deed with
that group over here, I just w ant to go out and do this project Up front it takes a long
time to establish those relationships with the fisheries guys and all those other agencies
and groups and whatnot. It takes a long time to get that up front but once you establish
that relationship, you feel comfortable with him, we're at the point now where, shoot, it's
no big deal, I mean w e get permission from a fisheries biologist over the phone to do, you
know, they feel trust, they have a lot of trust and creditability with us and they say, ’Oh,
yeah, you know what you're doing, go ahead and do it.' But up front it took us years to
get where we're at, but now that we're there, we've put a lot o f time in but, shoot, now it's
a piece of cake. You know all the players."

JS:

"if there's a problem - agriculture vs. U.S. Fish & W ildlife - bring those two groups
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together, [and] talk about it. People are actually big enough to sit there and tell you to
your face instead of the usual confrontation stuff."

Community Relationships
The "grapevine" is another example o f local relationships working to help or hinder
agreem ent
W hen conservationists are well-received and lay to rest people's concerns, then:
GS:

"...then you can start seeing how things, how the grapevine, really starts to work. And
things just take off at that point"

W hen conservationists do not built trust, then:
GS:

"As soon as w e had that first meeting, that's w hen the rumor mill started about, 'Boy
there's this big movement and these guys are cooking a conservation strategy up to m ove
the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area up to H ighw ay 89.' And that's how that w hole rumor,
the grapevine, the phones started ringing and then, then w e were on the defense from
there on."

f

:
|

How I Reached These Conclusions
I focused this study on face-to-face encounters between conservationists and landowners,

f

This required qualitative research methods, which I describe in the following sub-section,

I

Studying th e Bargain. In the next sub-section, Creating an Incentive, I explain how this

?

approach show s that incentives are created by agreements.

k

I

Studying the Bargain

F.

I
t
;

Accepting the importance of understanding face-to-face encounters between
conservationists and local people still leaves the problem o f knowing how to study those

t

j

encounters. This section explains how I studied those encounters.

1

Gathering Data
I review ed 48 cases of voluntary agreements betw een landowners and conservationists
(Table 1). For each case I had at least an anecdote describing what happened (n=14), and for
others I had written or photographic material (n=15), and for som e I also collected interviews
(n=19). Because I collected multiple interviews per case, the total number of interviews is n=26. I
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looked for differences among the ideas of people within each case and also between cases. For
example, the Blackfoot Challenge case and ProjectSHARE both involve groups in which pairs of
people reach agreements of their own. The Blackfoot Challenge interviews em phasize one-onone agreements and Project SHARE em phasizes group work. The landowners interviewed for
this report are ranchers, small agricultural business managers, large industrial-lands managers,
and sm all ow ners with employment o ff the property.

Table 1. List of cases studied. (A.) Types of information. (B.) Names and
anecdotes of cases.

A. Type of information gathered_______ Number of C ases
Interviews, Materials, Anecdote
19
(note: total number of interviews, n= 26 )

Materials, Anecdote
Anecdote
Total

15
14
48

B. N am es and anecdotes of c a se s
CASE NAME______________________________________________ INFORMATION GATHERED
A C E B a sin
Anecdote Material
A cooperative group that restored an estuary where the Ashepoo, C om bahee, and Edisto Rivers converge in
S outh Carolina.
A p p le g a te P a rtn e rs h ip
Anecdote Material
T he AP is a community-based project in southwestern Oregon involving industry, conservation groups, natural
resource agencies, and residents cooperating to encourage and facilitate the use of natural resources by
principles that promote ecosystem health and diversity. Through community involvement and education, this
partnership supports management of all land within the watershed in a m anner that sustains natural resources,
and that will in turn, contribute to econom ic and community stability within the Applegate valley.
B lack B e a r C o n s e rv a tio n C om m ittee
Anecdote Material Interviews
A group of private, state, and federal wildlife professionals, timber com pany personnel, farmers, and
environmentalists that has organized to study and manage the Louisiana black bear.
•
£
[

B lackfoot C h a lle n g e
Anecdote Material Interviews
A cooperative group formed in the Blackfoot Valley in western MT to coordinate efforts of conservationists and
reach voluntary agreements with landowners. Since formation, they have accepted an invitation to becom e a
working group for the Montana Bull Trout Restoration Team.
Bull T ro u t R e sto ra tio n T e a m
Anecdote Material Interviews
M ontana Governor Marc Racicot held a roundtable, which produced a task force, that was charged with
planning and implementing the restoration of bull trout in Montana.
C alifornia C o a s ta l H ab itats (N CCP)
Anecdote Material
T he National Fish and Wildlife Foundation funded the state agency to establish innovative plan to protect
critical California coastal sag e habitat and species that depend on it. The parties are trying to form a preserve
system .
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C a m e ro n C o u n ty Ag-W ildlife C o e x iste n c e C o m m itte e
Anecdote Material Interviews
A group diverse interests in Cameron Co.. T exas, that organized to coordinate pesticide u se with reintroduction
of Aplomado falcon (Falco femoralis).
C h ic k a sa w -S h ilo h R e s o u rc e C o n serv atio n a n d D e v e lo p m e n t C o u n cil, Inc.
Anecdote
A group in western T ennessee trying to implement ‘b est m anagem ent practices’ on cropland in the B ear Creek
w atershed to reduce annual sediment load by 50% by providing technical assistance and educational outreach
to farm ers.
C o lo ra d o D ivision o f W ildlife
Anecdote Material
The Division acts a s a franchiser by requiring financial com pensation and specified perform ance from a
landowner, the franchisee, in exchange for th e right to sell big-game hunting permits (see p. 69).
C raw fo rd a n d B o u rla n d C o nsulting F o re s te rs
Anecdote Material Interviews
T hese consultants arrange fee-access program s for private landowners in the southeastern U.S. (see p. 63)
D e fe n d e rs o f W ildlife
Anecdote Material Interviews
In the Rocky Mountain region. Defenders offers two programs: one com pensates ranchers who lose stock to
wolves, the other rewards ranchers when wolves den on their property (see p. 62).

Delta Waterfowl Foundation

Anecdote Material Interviews
In the D akotas and central Canada, Delta le a se s private property to establish nesting cover for waterfowl (see
P- 65).

D e s e re t L and a n d L iv esto ck
Anecdote Material Interviews
Deseret participated with the Utah Division of Wildlife in the m anagem ent of a rare sub-species of cutthroat
trout by creating a holding pond at their own expense. Deseret recovers its cost by selling catch-and-release
angling excursions (see p. 70).
|
I

•
i
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f
|
|

D uck s U nlim ited
Anecdote Material
DU arran g es with landowners to promote the quality of waterfowl habitat and maintain private ownership of
land. They run a private lands program including the Central Valley of California, North D akota pothole region,
and A rkansas lower Mississippi Valley.
ECO TRU ST
Anecdote
C reated a regional planning team of governm ent agencies, major landowners, commercial and recreational
fishermen, and others to develop multi-jurisdictional habitat restoration and salmon m anagem ent plan for
Willapa Bay, WA, region. ECOTRUST is an offshoot of Conservation International.

t
I
£
i

E n d a n g e re d S p e c ie s P ro g ra m
Anecdote Material
The com ponent of federal policy, administered by the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service that identifies and
elim inates harm to listed species.

fi
£
*

E n v iro n m en tal D e fe n s e F u n d
Anecdote Material
EDF le a s e s w ater rights from landowners, e.g.. Skyline Ranch W ater Lease (see p. 65).

j

R e d -c o c k a d e d W o o d p e c k e r
Anecdote Material
The Red-cockaded Woodpecker Recovery Program plans to offer incentives to landowners based on numbers
of individual birds.

I

t,

I
!
1

F ish A m erica F o u n d a tio n
Anecdote
Coordinates nonprofit sport-fishing and conservation organizations to conduct sm all-scale w ater resource and
fish en h ancem ent projects in U.S. and its territories.
F ossil Rim W ildlife C e n te r
Anecdote Material Interviews
This private group h as a permit to breed endangered species at their 3,000-acre ranch in Glen R ose. TX. They
try to fund the work by selling admission to a drive-through zoo of free-ranging African wildlife.
F ro n tla n d e rs
Anecdote Material Interviews
A group of public and private conservationists on the eastern front of the Rocky Mountains in Montana who
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tried to form a collaborative group. Som e landow ners eventually broke off from tbe group in suspicion of the
conservationists and formed their own, “property rights" group.
Milk R iv e r B a sin P ro je c t; P ra irie P o th o le P ro je c t
Anecdote
A multiple-partner waterfowl m anagem ent project guided by the North American Waterfowl M anagem ent Plan
with budgets in th e millions of dollars.
M ississip p i D e p a rtm e n t o f Wildlife, F is h e rie s a n d P a r k s
A necdote
The Department is restoring 10,000 acres o f private wetland habitat important to wintering waterfowl and other
migratory birds using 10-year habitat developm ent agreem ents with private landowners.

Nature Conservancy

Anecdote Material Interviews
The Conservancy accepts donations of limited rights to land, usually related to developm ent, which they
purposely do not u se so as to protect biodiversity. They also reach hand-shake ag reem en ts to establish
conservation practices (see pp. 35, 41).

O c e lo t R e c o v e ry o n P riv a te L and
A necdote Material Interviews
The Feline R esearch Program at the C a e sa r Kleberg Wildlife Research Institute in Kingsville. TX, is trying to
arrange an agreem ent to survey for and possibly reintroduce ocelots to private ranches in southern Texas.
O re g o n W a te r T ru st
Anecdote Material
This non-profit group leases w ater rights in order to leave water instream. They lea se the rights from
landowners who normally divert the w ater to irrigate fields (see p. 65).
P a c ific R iv e rs C ouncil
Anecdote
The Council is developing comm unity-based restoration projects for the Rogue, McKenzie and G rande Ronde
w atersheds to create jobs and improve local econom ic conditions a s well a s restore th e se ecosystem s.

Patenting genes

Anecdote
Corporations and other firms are experimenting with w ays to establish property rights over genetic material.
Jum a (1996) reviews issues in patenting life forms, especially plants, from the perspective of Third World
Africa.

P e re g r in e F u n d
Anecdote Material
The Fund restores birds of prey through partnerships, with permits for handling endangered sp ecies (see p.
70).

r
|
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P lu m C r e e k T im b e r C o ., L .P .
Anecdote Material Interviews
Plum Creek w as granted an "incidental take permit” pursuant to regulations under the E ndangered S pecies Act
for Habitat Conservation Plans (50 CFR 17.22(b)(1)).
P riv a te b re e d in g facilities
Anecdote Material
Wolf Sanctuaries, a small group in Indiana, and others like it, have permits to breed red wolves in captivity (see
F ossil Rim).

P riv a te R a n c h e s o f M o n ta n a , Inc.
Anecdote Material
Private Rancries w as a cooperative of landowners inMontana that attem pted to sell a c c e ss to their complex of
properties to hunters. The venture failed.

f
;
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P ro je c t S H A R E (S a lm o n H a b ita t a n d R iv er E n h a n c e m e n t)
Anecdote Material Interviews
A collaborative group of landowners, conservationists, academ ics, and agencies inand around W ashington
Co., Maine, collaborating to restore Atlantic salmon (Salmo salat) by enhancing rivers (se e p. 73).
R e d W o lf R e c o v e ry P ro g ra m
A necdote Material Interviews
The Red W olf Program reintroduced red wolves in North Carolina and T en n essee using the non-essential,
experimental designation under the Endangered S pecies Act (see p. 71).

R e d w o o d C o a s t E n v iro n m e n ta l Law C e n te r
Anecdote
The Center is organizing local groups, governm ents, and corporations to monitor, rehabilitate, and restore
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w atersheds along sta te ’s northern 400-mile Pacific Coast ecosystem.
R o ck y M ountain Elk F o u n d a tio n E a s e m e n t p ro g ra m
Anecdote Material Interviews
The Elk Foundation accepts donated e asem en ts from landowners w hose property offers worthy habitat
features for elk.

Ruffed Grouse Society

A necdote
The Society conducts woodcock habitat and research efforts throughout ruffed grouse range in cooperation
with federal, state, and pnvate landowners.

Seeking Common Ground

A necdote
A partnership of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, American Farm Bureau Federation. Public Lands
Council, Wildlife M anagem ent Institute. Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. International Association of Fish and
Wildlife Agencies, USDA Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and private partners su ch a s the
Nevada Cattlem an’s Association, and supporters like the Boone and Crockett Club, Society for R ange
Management, Isaac Walton League, and the Association of Conservation Districts. T hese groups work
together to coordinate grazing and wildlife m anagem ent on public and private property.

Sport Fishing Institute

Anecdote

The Institute h as created an information network of anglers, businesses, and local and state governm ents in
Great Lakes region to promote fisheries conservation and m anagem ent

Tennessee Biodiversity Program

Anecdote

The T en n essee Conservation League, with support from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, is
developing geographic information system d a tab a se s to provide to community decision-m akers in T en n essee
to encourage land-use planning and land m anagem ent decisions to follow principles of sustainable
developm ent

Texas Parks and Wildlife

A necdote Material

Leases of private land for Attwater prairie chicken habitat (see p. 64)

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Conservation Reserve Program
|

|

A necdote Material
Through the Conservation Reserve, the Departm ent of Agriculture leases private land to establish soil-retaining
vegetative cover (see p. 65).

U .S . F ish an d Wildlife S e rv ic e M e m o ra n d a
Anecdote Material
The Fish and Wildlife Service h as been developing policy for voluntary agreem ents with landowners by
entering into a variety of agreem ents in the southeastern U.S. and elsewhere. T hese include m em oranda of
agreem ent and understanding, and Conservation Agreements, all of which in so m e way grant landowners
authority to harm endangered sp ecies incidentally to otherwise lawful activities (se e p. 71).

s
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U .S . F ish an d W ildlife S e rv ic e , P a rtn e rs fo r W ildlife
A necdote Material Interviews
Through the Partners Program, the Fish and Wildlife Service provides technical assistan ce and cost-sharing
projects to private landowners who agree to restore wetland habitats (see p. 67).
W e tla n d s for th e A m e ric a s
Anecdote
Wetlands conducts w orkshops on m anagem ent of private wetlands for federal and state agency personnel in
charge of private lands outreach program s in CA, LA. MA, SC, northern IA, and southern MN. The group
works also in Mexico.
W ildlife H abitat C ouncil
Arranges wildlife habitat improvements on corporate campuses.

Anecdote

W isc o n sin W aterfow l A sso c ia tio n
Anecdote
The Association collaborates with private landowners to restore small wetlands, using volunteers to identify
restoration sites and conduct on-site evaluations.
END OF TABLE 1
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My methods for collecting these data came from the field of qualitative research.
Qualitative research is a broad term covering the work of scholars whose data are observations,
interviews, documents, archives, and artifacts of everyday human life. My interview technique
w as the “unstructured ... open-ended ethnographic (in-depth) interview” (Fontana and Frey
1994:365). It is a normal conversation that continues throughout the study because
"conversations, albeit intermittent, are like ordinary relationships, capable o f continuity"
(Schatzman and Strauss 1973:74).
For each interview, I found a person w ho has reached agreement, arranged a meeting,
and asked for his or her story about reaching agreement. The only influence I intended to exert
was "stimulating the inarticulate, loosening the tongue-tied, [and] steering the 'run-aways'"
(Schatzman and Strauss 1973:74). I ended each conversation by thanking the person, explaining
that I would study the transcript of our talk and stay in touch. I also asked to be referred to other
people, preferably those with a different experience with agreement. I tape-recorded most
interviews (n=20), and wrote notes during the others (n=6).
The field of qualitative research is wide, with various methods. The field is, like the data
themselves, "open-ended" and resistant to "a single, umbrella-like paradigm" (Denzin and Lincoln
)
«
]

I

1995:352). Perhaps the only commonality am ong the various philosophical types of qualitative
fieldwork is its strength, which "has always been the 'thick description' of the local, which is
glossed over altogether by most other methods" (Snow and Morrill 1995:360). Geertz (1983)
called a "thick description" one that explains the meaning of actions for their actors as explicitly as

f

possible. It describes habits o f thought and action that people have acquired by living in their

|

community; it describes whatever one needs to know or believe in order to act acceptably among

1

members o f a culture. This cultural analysis is meant to describe, whereas traditional

|

hypothesis-testing is meant to verify. "The analysis of [culture i s ] ... not an experimental science

|

in search o f law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz 1983:38). A study of

|

landowners' culture is designed to describe how these people reached agreement, not to verify a

I

preconceived notion of w h y they are reached.

|

One variety of qualitative research is called grounded theory, and its developers have
concluded, after reviewing it with ethnography, phenomenological approach, life histories, and
conversational analysis that the purposes o f the different approaches "don't appreciably differ for
different researchers" (Strauss and Corbin 1990:21). They describe qualitative research as a
"nonmathematical analytic procedure ... [using] data gathered by a variety of means [that
include] observations ... interviews ... documents, books, videotapes, and even data that have
been quantified for other purposes such as census data" (Strauss and Corbin 1990:18). The
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analytic or interpretive work centers on coding, which is the process of labeling observations,
statements, events and other elements of qualitative data and then organizing them into
categories. This is the challenging process of looking at som ething obvious, like the conversation
between an agency forester and a hiker at a trailhead, and describing it. This is the scientific skill
of observation to which T eddy Roosevelt referred w hen speaking to the American Museum in
1918: "what is most needed is not the ability to see w hat very few people can see, but to see what
alm ost anybody can see, but nobody takes the trouble to look at" (Roosevelt 1918:390).

Analyzing Data
I analyzed the interviews by classifying concepts in the text. This created a hierarchy, or
typology, of concepts. Starting with a text, such as an interview transcript, I labeled segments
with descriptive codes that summarized their meaning. The statement, "I got hold of him to find
out if w e might plan a stream restoration project," was coded as "contacting" and sub-coded as
"cold-call" or "acquaintance" to differentiate contacts m ade for the first time from contacts made
in the course of a relationship. I then entered codes in The Ethnograph, version 4.0 (Seidel et al.
1995), which enabled me to list all segments from all interviews under each code, creating a
|
i
I

hierarchy of concepts. This hierarchy became the outline o f what I described below as R eaching
Agreement.

l
j

Reporting the Analysis

|

In reporting w ords from the interviews, I have tried to represent (i.e„ re-present what

|

was presented to me) the m any things that happen during an agreem ent without trying to isolate

I
i
j
t
f

any one thing that makes agreement work. I attempt to represent peoples' view s faithfully by
quoting them as frequently as possible to illustrate the concepts.

|

Creating an Incentive

i

(

This story from a conservationist em ployed by a federal incentive program show s that

i

incentives are created by an offer to "trade-off" interests.

s

GN:

"I told him, I said, 'Hey, these are the kind o f things you can do to improve your
operation. N ow , w hat can w e do to help you?' It was just a trade-off... to help do som e
duck habitat, or whatever, wetland enhancement and yet w e might gain off-site watering,
some cross-fencing, grazing. You tell them w hat you wanted and it was seeing if you
could get it done.
"Obviously, they saw just the ... they see the opportunities, from there on, it was sort of
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saying, 'Well w hat can w e do to help you out?"’

Focusing on trade-offs between conservationists and landowners not only clarifies
incentives, but also focuses on a void of knowledge identified by previous scholars.
Coase (1984:231), the economist, said, "Modem institutional econom ics should study man
as he is, acting w ithin the constraints imposed by real institutions." Real institutions, for Coase
(1984) include the local custom s that influence face-to-face encounters.
The failure o f conservationists to recognize local customs and other real institutions
frustrated Leopold (1942:295), the biologist, who complained that "we deal w ith bureaus, policies,
laws, and program s which are the symbols of our problem, instead o f with resources, products,
and land-users which are the problems."
M angun and M angun (1991:3), the conservation policy analysts, saw the emphasis on
rules and procedure as making conservation top-heavy: "the absence of a prominent role for local
governm ent [has created a] dual federalism with the federal governm ent and state governments
dominant w ithin their ow n jurisdictions."
Sociologists have described the difference between formal national institutions and
informal local ones as the difference between an "imaginary and mechanical structure" such as
laws and policies and a "real and organic life" of customs and habits (Tonnies 1988:33).
The bottom line, as field conservationists can tell you from experience, is that unless
conservationists understand and work with local people, conservation w ill not change
management on private land (Thomas 1997).

Reaching Agreement
Consider this statement.
GN:

"...once y o u ’ve m ade the initial contact—you’ve decided on w ho you want to contact,
when you w ant to contact them, and you start talking to them—there's several things that
you d o or don’t do."

j
;

This person encapsulated agreement as a process depending right behavior. In this
section I describe the process and the right behavior used by people I interviewed. The main
stages are Starting, Contacting, Listening/Talking, and O ffering. These stages differ slightly
between agreem ents reached between two people and those reached by groups o f people
working together, and I w ill point out those differences along the way.
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Starting
Meetings, Personal Visits, and Simple Projects
These are the ways people went out to find potential partners. Agreements started when
a conservationist or landowner had an interest at stake that m otivated them to start talking about
agreement. Beginnings were in group meetings, personal visits, and sim ple projects.

RF:

"We started in, w e met dow n in Charlotte, North Carolina, where the APA meeting was,
and everybody thought it was a great idea. We met that Spring, I'd say w e started
January 94, calling up and talking about who do w e need to talk to.
"Then w e had a meeting on the ESA and [PN] was there.”

GN:

"We decided to just knock on some doors essentially and see if these folks were interested
in restoring those wetlands."

GS:

"Sometimes it started with something as simple as a goose nesting structure, giving the
landowner, you know it's kind of like a free sample. You might say and we'd give them a
goose nesting structure ... in fact, we've given them som ething they can put out there and
make a connection with wildlife to and a lot of time that the follow ing year might lead to
a call to [us for another deal]."

GS:

"The other thing that really sort of kicked off the Partners program was the Fish and
Wildlife Service involvem ent in the Blackfoot was w e acquired that property along
H ighway 200, the Blackfoot waterfowl Production Area."

Spending Time in the Community
Starting is more them just encountering people. GS explained that by traveling to and
from jobs on "that property along Highway 200" he and his partner had many opportunities to
m eet landowners in the community. He pointed out that this was possible because they had the
time to spend in the community.

GS:

"The thing that agencies don't have because we see everything in terms of fiscal years
and acres and dollars expended and upper management wants results. They don't want
to see you invest a year of your life or of a staff or staff hours and in a project and get to
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that year and say, 'O.K. how many acres and how many dollars have you spent?' And
you say, 'Haven't spent very much but I spent a lot of time in Trixi’s bar and gotten to
know the network o f the community and developing trust A lot o f agencies are not
willing to invest that kind of time on the front end of it I'm not sure whether some
agencies either can afford to do that because they've got such a huge workload and such
limited staff."

Contacting
Once som e concept of agreement is in mind, people looking to deal begin meeting
possible partners with the intent of reaching agreem ent These possible partners could be
individuals or groups.

RF:

"I take it on as an individual project, go down, meet with them, go to their club, go to
their supper."

GS:

"We didn't know a lot o f the players. Went over there it was kind of non-traditional
property for us because, unique property, because it had river frontage ... called a
meeting together in 19 it must of been fall of 89 w e brought the Forest Service; Fish,
W ildlife, and Parks; highway folks, Ducks Unlimited, I think w e even had Trout
Unlimited there and w e said, Hey we're new landowners in the valley what would, like,
h ow would...((that w as the end of the statement))".

RF:

"We called them and talked to them, but best thing to do is m eet them somewhere, you
can't talk to them over the phone, best thing to do is look a man in the eye, you got to see
if he's blinking or turning around when you're talking. No, we'd make a point of i t ... call
and say can you meet m e for breakfast or something."

GS:

"We had to do a lot of work to identify the landowners..."
One landowner they knew, JS, said, "I tried to get them around to the people who would

be w illing to sit down and actually talk."

GN:

"We talked at length about the best ways to approach landowners. It's a salesman's you
know you really out selling a product so do you write letters? do telephone calls? do
you knock on doors? do you inconvenience the landowners during haying season while
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he's calving I mean all these things come up and there's right and wrong ways to do them
and our gut reaction has been that a telephone call, you know, like a vacuum cleaner
salesman calling you at night, 'Ay, I'm with the Fish and Wildlife Service, w e want to
restore a wetland out there are you interested?' Click. 'No I'm not interested.' So that's
out of the question. A letter, we only get about on the average probably 10 -15% response
back on letters sent out on the p a st”

Contact was easy for conservationists who spent enough time in the community that local
people could get in touch with them.

JS:

"I w ent through [LL] and got ahold of [GS], I think is how we did it. I can't remember for
sure ... They'd been out looking at things before, been up and dow n the streams there."

Talking/Listening
When these people say they are talking, they mean they are "in the talking stage", as in:
"we w ere already in the talking stage by then"; or,
"It's surprising what happens when they get together and start talking."

In the talking stage of an agreement, these people are sharing ideas about w hat they
might do together, but they are not yet proposing to act. They are learning and beginning to care
about others' interests or activities and sometimes they are identifying conflicts between others'
interests or activities and their own. There is also talking that doesn't pertain to the interests in
the deal; this might be called small-talk, which also is a preface to action. Talking is a tool for
venting and compromise.
Listening is more than just being present while som eone was talking. It means
understanding and respecting another person's interests. Listening is the opposite o f having
m ade up one's mind:

GS:

"I think everybody listened somewhat, but [one group] said they had their big plan no
matter w hat w as said by who at that meeting."

WS:

"[GS] came in with his eyes and his mind open, and listened. He didn't com e in and say,
'This is your problem, you've got to do this, this, and this.'
"He made you feel like you were worth something. Whether you were having a bad day
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or a bad year."

JS:

"They ((GS and GN)) found out it was a whole lot better to be open to our concerns and
then m aybe come in with their concerns afterwards."

T alking/L istening is the biggest part of agreement, so here is a summary of the subheadings:
1.

Small-talk

2.

Privacy

3.

Sharing an idea of something to do together, not an offer

4.

A w ay of learning and caring

5.

A w ay of venting and resolving m isunderstandings

6.

H olding Your Tongue

Small-talk
Before sharing ideas about what could be done, or even venting or learning about
?

another's interests, the talking stage is about small-talk.

k

^

GS:

"Hey, h o w are things going, you know, the weather over here blah, blah, blah. I think

f

that helps a lot setting the stage to begin to talk about getting to where you w ant to go. I

|

think if y o u go in and you immediately, boom, go to talking to the guy about restoring a

|

wetland or som ething you're going to fail with that approach, that's just been my

j

experience and then [GN] w ould tell you the same thing."

i
jf

Small talk seem s easy enough, but one must avoid "simple things that could turn

17

j

landowners off' (GN).

[
f
1
L
;

GN:

r

"You try to start off a conversation with a landowner talking about crops, weather,
talking about his cow s and what not, but you could mess up. Som ething like, drive up
and say, 'Your cows are looking good this year.'
I don't know w hat a good cow looks like from a bad cow and you know by saying, you
know', 'your cow s are looking good this year' when maybe they're looking bad to him and
you, or crops, you know, sam e way, if you don't know w hat you're talking about... I've
seen more agency people shoot themselves in the foot by trying to buffalo their way
through talking about... trying to connect with the landowner on ag-related stuff if they
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don't know what they're talking about."
G:

"So how do you do it?"

GN:

"You say, 'How are your crops doing this year?'
"They say, 'Oh, boy it’s a great year!’
"You say, 'Yeah, yeah, things are looking good.'
You don't have to know a lot about it, but you just don't stick your foot in your mouth
right off the start I've got a gut reaction on how the weather's been but I don't — from a
wildlife perspective —but I'm not sure w hat that means for his hay crops."

A genuine concern for the other person's situation makes for good small-talk.
GS:

"I always try' to ask about you know, personal, som e of that stuff sounds corny and kooky
but you'd be amazed at people's human behavior, you know, lik e ... the other day ... I
think the first half an hour w e talked about calving. And talked about problems with
scours and its a wet spring. That kind o f stuff m ade him feel a lot more at ease with me
he felt like I was, you know, I had a genuine concern about his way of life and he's having
a tough year, he's lost 80 calves this year to scours and so those kind of things."

k.

Privacy

I
I
i
|
f

Som e landowners and conservationists m ade a clear point that the talking phase should
be kept q u ie t
BP:

"People don't like open house."

E

i
I

One person explained that he parks his unmarked truck out of sight from neighbors so

4

s

the landowner need not worry about them becoming curious about what he or she is considering

£

doing on the land.

Sharing an idea of something to do together, not an offer
RF:

"I got talking with other companies, and w e all talk back and forth, and I said we've
ow n ed this land for hundred years and have never cut and run, so we have a good story
to tell. We're already doing a good job, but getting no credit for i t ... so I told them what
we're doing and what w e want to do and how we're going to protect this and do these
things.
"[BC] and I talked it over som e beers and he said, yeah, w e need to do something along
those lines."
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Similar talk goes on with small landowners in one-on-one deals.
GN:

"We got on the ranch that w ay and then w e just got visiting about different things w e
could do, things you know. I mentioned things I would like to find a w ay to fix som e of
these things and they came up with ideas and we were just back and forth then."

A way of learning and caring
Talking helps these people find things out: the w ay each other feels, and also what their
interests are and w hat they are doing.
RF:

"If we're not talking then w e don't know what each other is doing and w e don't care. But
if w e get together and can say you almost ruined us last year, then w e get som e free flow
of information and get a lot of people involved."

KH:

"The group has been a process o f getting things out on the table—[it's been] a coordination
mechanism of all the entities' duties, inclinations, and responsibilities, [so these] are all
available at once—it makes them more evident
"There's a lot of caution people use at those meetings; they are careful about w hat they
expose regarding what they'll su pp ort it's a negotiation, it's frustrating at one level, but
it's understandable."

GS:

"We found out nobody's talking, everybody's too busy. Things don't happen until w e
stop long enough to go out and talk with all of our state fish and gam e agencies and other
publics. Otherwise, there's lots of problems [from] just not spending a lot of time on the
front end, talking about what works."

For example.
GW:

"We have irrigation dams and we're finding if we release the water at the bottom of the
dam instead of letting it spill over the top, we're releasing colder water, which helps the
salmon. N o w if som eone came along and said don't do anything in this stretch of the
river because it's salmon habitat, w e wouldn't know what w e were doing wrong, but if
w e did w e would stop it or maybe do something to help. So these lines of
communication, a lot of little things, but added up it helps the entire effort."
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A way of venting and resolving misunderstandings
In talking, one biologist was able to clarify several concerns of a landowner that had
nothing to do with the possible agreement.
GN:

"I was able to say, well, that's not really true w e do pay a set am ount [of property tax],
"'Well what about weeds7 You guys aren't going to control your w e e d s/
"No. We are going to control the w eeds over there.
"'Well, what about fire? I’m worried about fire.'
"Well, w e plan to do some limited haying, w e plan to do som e limited grazing.
"So those things helped him feel more comfortable. But you get through the first half
hour, that's all you do, you listen to him and kinda see his point of view."

Holding Your Tongue
Part o f succeeding in Talking is holding your tongue. Sometimes this requires biting
your tongue.
WS:

"Sometimes it tests your patience a little. The one that gets me every tim e ... w hen they
say you've got to get back to nature. If I hear anyone say that I know I'm in deep shit and
I better keep m y mouth shut"

Other times, holding your tongue is just a matter of patience.
I

GN:

"When the rancher takes me on a drive through his place there's alw ays things that I'm
seeing. You know, I'm seeing drained wetlands I'm seeing over grazed riparian areas,
w eeds, I mean, poor timber management. I mean, every property whether its private or
public has got problems, but what I don't do is come off right away and say, G eez, there’s

j

a drained wetland right there, boy, w e should move these corrals.'
"I just allow him to show me his property and get off his chest what he w ants to show
me, som ething he's been thinking about: putting in a pond or offset water or whatever."

This last point, about patience and holding your tongue, was described as critical not
only for avoiding arguments, but also for setting up the Offering stage.

Offering
Offering is the stage where negotiating begins. A person who reviewed an earlier draft of
this paper, disagreed that any negotiation takes place in the Talking/Listening stage. From his
perspective, negotiation begins when specific commitments to projects are offered.
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Wait for the Right Time
The time for moving to the offering stage is when the talking is done, which depends on
the person you are talking with and your ability to read him or her.
SM:

"[we're at the] end of the formative process stage, entering the 'doing' stage."

GN:

"Sometimes it might be tw o years dow n the road before you say, 'Y'know I...'
"You get to that thing you saw on the first trip. 'I noticed that drained wetland back
there, what do you think about restoring it?'
"And if you bring it up right aw ay ... like a conservation ea sem en t... if that's the first
thing out of your mouth, pack your bags because he’s going to send you."

JS:

"You've got to sit back and look at the people, and ease into certain ones. There are some
you can just go up to and talk to and you're fine, other ones, they're going to [be
skeptical]. It works that way."

GS:

"I think it varies with each landowner. They all have their different signals, but the thing
is you got to Ieam to get to know them, to know what their signals are, to feel a comfort
level, to have them feel comfortable with you. And what I hope is that - when I know I’m
in with the landowners - w hen he sees me as [GS] and not as [my organization] and
when that point happens then I think you can move on to those issues.
"Sometimes that’s the first time you sit down at the table and som etim es its ... not for a
long time. I've ... sat dow n for the first time and within the first day and visited with
people about conservation easem ents and come away from that m eeting feeling like,
'Yep, we'll put an easem ent on this place.' And other people you know and som e of them
we've been waiting for three, for four years.”
"They develop more and more o f a comfort level with [us] and that generally leads to an
opportunity to bring them to a discussion of maintain a rural lifestyle, you know, the
family rancher, [and] you have discussions about easements."

Appeal to a Person’s Interests
Offers appeal to the person's interests, for example, a landowner's management
objectives.
GN:

"I told him, I said, 'Hey, these are the kind of things you can do to improve your
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operation. N ow , what can w e do to help you?' It was just a trade-off... to help do some
duck habitat, or whatever, wetland enhancement and yet we m ight gain off-site watering,
som e cross-fencing, grazing. You tell them what you wanted and it was seeing if you
could get it done.
"Obviously, they saw just the ... they see the opportunities, from there on, it w as sort of
saying, 'Well what can w e do to help you out?'"
"Then you are able to say, 'Well, w hat are your goals long-term? What do you w ant to
see with your ranch?' That then generally, in the Blackfoot, at least, [leads to]
conservation easements."

Part of a successful offer is ability to customize it.
JS:

"Now [one group] is coming in w ith their new grazing things ... it's a wreck. They got
their set lines from headquarters or someplace, wherever they did them, and it's generic
for everywhere in the world and you can't do that, it just doesn't work. They're com ing
ou t with that and it just isn't working at all. They are setting them selves back ten years."

A Generic Offer at First
Som e people start with a general idea of what agreements could be reached.
RF:

"((reading)) 'SHARE is open to people committed to an ethical approach to land
stewardship to consider all forest and natural resources including anadromous and
resident species of fish.'
"We were trying to keep anyone from saying, 'Oh I can't do that because it flies in the
face of...((sentence trails off)).'
"It was a generic approach at first, but w e knew we could get narrowed in later. We

|

were criticized by several people for having a wide-brush approach, and w e did, because

fr

if you came in and saw this narrow little space you had to crawl through, that
discourages people and they ride off."

Gathering Information
People bring science into agreement all throughout the process, but it is during the
offering stage when science plays the biggest role. It can hold up the agreement process.
TF:

"The delay right now has been to w ait for the Scientific Group [to answer] What do w e
mean by recovery? And how do w e get there?"
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SS:

"The information will become truth for further talks in the Restoration Team."

Gathering information is hard because: (1) people have "saved the sticky issues for last";
(2)

"nobody has time or m oney to be sure" of all decisions; and, (3) "science is not pure and

absolute, players interpret science differently and derive standards and guidelines differently."
The upshot of this situation was summarized by SM:
SM;

"It's our job to fit the science into the politics. We'll either have to deal with these issues
or come out and say that we're not going to."

Referrals
The final aspect o f offering is knowing when interests do not match.
GN:

"You gotta know what your program is, what all the programs [offered by others] are,
when you sit d ow n with the landowner. You might say, 'Well I'm interested in waterfowl
habitat'
"He may not have any wetlands to restore or be interested but he m ight be interested in
the grazing system or m oving his corral so you have to know, w ell, you know, 'Maybe we
can't help you w ith this but maybe Fish, Wildlife, and Parks has got a program.' 'Well
this is more orientated toward fisheries...'

H-

?
I
i

"But if you're going to refer somebody, don't just give him the [phone] number, /k n o w ,
'Here ya go,' and forget about him. Make the call, set up the meeting, pick the guy up,
and go there together. Otherwise... ((sentence trails off))"

I

Other Concepts

f
(•
i

|

People raised other concepts that applied generally to reaching agreement,

Ownership
Ownership, also referred to as "buy-in," describes the sense am ong people working

j

together that the plan resulting from their work is theirs, and, therefore,they w ill make it, use it,

i

;

and care for it well.

-

GK:

"It takes local knowledge. The more you

localize, the more potential buy-in, the better

the solution, and longer lasting."

Accountability
Related to ownership is the concept of accountability.
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KH:

"There's a peer pressure th in g ... if a player is blatantly resisting, it might actually make
things worse for them ... you have to think hard about the long-term repercussions o f
your actions today.
"When everybody's at the table, you don't have many s.o.b.'s w ho w ill say, T his is m y
position and I’m sticking to it.'"

Lacking Resources
There was w ide agreement that lack of resources — time, labor, materials, equipm ent, and
m oney — is a fundamental limitation to agreem ent
KM:

"The limitation on strength of state-based institutions is finances, just like at the federal
le v e l... 'precluded' is a workload analysis."

This refers to the "warranted but precluded" decision by which U. S. Fish and W ildlife
Service passed up its opportunity to take authority for bull trout and left responsibility with
Montana.

GK:

"Having the Restoration Team shows that the problem is bigger than any one interest. It
allows us to pool resources."

SS:

"Now we're approaching the hand-off to the watershed groups and field people [who]
w ill be assigned the additional duty of sitting in on the watershed groups."

Some responsibilities have been funded ("we took a lot of projects and pieced together
enough funding"), but many have been added to "full time" responsibilities. N ot only are the
"field people" dealing with "additional duty," but the Restoration Team members them selves have
squeezed these meetings into their schedules. The same problem has been recognized for
members of the public who w ill be asked to join watershed groups, or w ho are trying to find time
to participate in the process. These people, it was noted, "have jobs too" and may already be
involved in other citizen advisory groups and, therefore, "may be burnt out."

Leadership
Leadership was generally described as the ability and w illingness among participants to
"commit [their group’s] interests or policy to matters affecting bull trout." Often, the Governor's
leadership was recognized: "... Governor [Racicot] is an outstanding individual. He is w illin g to
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deal with conflict and is interested in the gamut o f resources." "With this governor, Montana has
a strong record of these kinds of processes." Several members listed a governor's com m itm ent as
necessary for success in any state-based effort, and especially because this leadership w ou ld draw
the state w ildlife agency into a "willingness to budget for it" and to maintain the necessary
"viewpoint, number of people, and the qualifications" to succeed. Less often than the need for
gubernatorial leadership, but also present, was the view that the Restoration Team members must
lead. One supervisor considered it his "job to bring field people in on the goal."

Alternatives
People considering agreement are influenced by their options for getting what they want.
TF:

"[This process is] another path. The recovery plan [written by the group] may turn out as
good as what the Fish and Wildlife Service might have done, but I'm not sure w e have the
tools [to implement it] that the Fish and W ildlife Service m ight There are tools w e don't
have because there is no [Endangered Species Act].”

The tools TF referred to are regulations that com pel people to follow the recovery plan.
Another person considered those regulatory tools as a hindrance and an encouragement to reach
agreement instead.

GK:

"What makes these solutions possible is that they're non-regulatory. Federal law creates
authority that casts a chilling effect. If people can agree to a middle course, then each
entity can advance at least part of their agenda ... you can waste your time in the
legislature, or you can collaborate."

Momentum
People described momentum as if it w ere inertia: the tendency for something at rest to
stay put, or the tendency of something m oving to keep moving.
KH:

"Once a process gets going, the feeling develops that you don't want to fail. Once
mom entum is going, you don't want to see it fail."

PF:

"A certain amount of progress is necessary to maintain credibility."

LP:

"Fear [of the Endangered Species Act]— that's what's driving the bull trout case."
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External forces
People on the Bull Trout Restoration Team described three main external forces: (1)
possibility of lawsuits challenging the process; (2) effect of publicity on the discussion; and, (3)
frustration from the Governor's office. At a recent the Restoration Team meeting, a citizen brought
a video- and sound-recording team. One the Restoration Team member explained that "some
people are concerned about the trustworthiness o f this process." "What you saw here today
probably was preparation for a lawsuit." Members were not equally concerned about lawsuits,
some saw them as unavoidable possibilities, others expected that they would "reel from that" and
measured their w ords accordingly.
One member described routine public attendance at m eetings as also affecting the
process: "When i t s a public forum, it’s uncomfortable and stifles [discussion] som ew h at., it’s the
cost of public accountability." On the other hand, som e members see greater publicity as an
important objective o f the process —they want to "get bull trout in the news". This illustrates a
fundamental challenge in balancing local interest and national interest. Supposedly, local
interests w ill be represented in watershed groups. The national interest, however, is supposed to
be represented by the agencies. They do this through the National Environmental Policy Act
|

(NEPA), but no one y et knows where the NEPA process fits in the Restoration Team process,

f

O pposing the inhibiting effect of potential legal challenges and routine public scrutiny is

|
1t
|

pressure for faster results coming from "the Governor's office [which is] expressing som e

|

back the feds [by convening the Restoration Team], but w e got to get something done.'"

I

Conclusion

i
t
i

i

frustration with the slowness." This factor was described as if "the Governor is saying, ’I've held

The process o f agreement is not a set of steps to be follow ed as in a recipe.
GK:

"Anyone looking for a cook-book will be disappointed ... this is amorphous."

f
i
i
j

Nevertheless, there are conditions and com ponents necessary for progress. A com m unity
needs trust and relationships among its members before those people begin talking about their

f

interests and the possibilities for agreement. A certain amount of starting is required before
contacts are made. Then, as I heard plainly, a certain amount of listening and talking m ust go one
before "you can m ove on." "Sometimes that's the first time you sit down at the table and
sometimes its ... not for a long time.1'
Agreement is a complex phenomenon, but it can be likened to a pyramid. Leopold (1939)
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proposed a pyramid as a model of ecological relationships and I believe the sam e model fits
agreement by analogy. The biotic pyramid consists of layers, each a little smaller than the one
below it, that build up to a cap (Fig. 3). "Each successive layer depends on those below for food
and often for other services, and each in turn furnishes food and services to those above"
(Leopold 1939:268). In agreement, the layers are: starting, contacting, listening/talking, offering,
and then the agreement itself.
Though the pyramid model captures m ost o f the agreement process I observed, it cannot
account for som e details on which landowners and conservationists in my study disagreed.
These details are:
1.

Buying land may or may not be a good w ay to enter a com munity and be
available. Some people spoke of this as helping, others spoke o f it as a deadly
mistake for public agencies or non-profit groups, with whom it fuels fears of
public take-over of private land.

2.
|
5

"Progressive thinking" seems to mean willingness to try new w ays of managing
land and dealing with landowners. It could mean, however, acceptable thinking.

3

•

3.

A greem ent My interviews focused on reaching agreement, but the act of

|
I
|

agreement itself probably has its ow n meaning. I hope that in the process of
reaching agreement, a landowner and conservationist learn or make whatever

|

rules are necessary for the act of agreement itself.

r
b

j?

Finally, because o f these details, and because this description of agreement is not

S

a

designed to be generalizable to every community, conservationists and landowners should use

E

this m odel only as a first idea of how to reach agreement in their communities.

I
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a negotiated arrangem ent of rival Interests In resources

meet potential partners personally; use grapevine and relationships

I

Learn and enter the grapevine, build relationships, identify interests and where they overlap

or rival each other; hire the 'right person;' cultivate or look for 'progressive thinking'

Circumstances:

Starting Jook for ‘free sam ples,' be available; form a general idea of agreements; invest time in starting

Contacting:

T a l k i n g / L i s t e n i n g : share Ideas; learn; care; vent and resolve; talk small

wait for a signal; appeal to goals/interests; customize; say no if you must

Agreement:

Offering:

«■

Soil

Plants

Plant-eating insects

Insect-eating birds and rodents

Herbivorous mammals

Bird- and rodent-eating mammals

Carnivores

Fig. 3. Pyramid models: (A) The biotic view of land (Leopold 1939); (B) The social view of agreement.
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Although trusting relationships are necessary for voluntary agreement, people also need
terms for their agreements. These econom ic details are difficult in conservation because land
blends public and private ownerships. Som e public interests are affected by h ow private land
owners manage their land; therefore, the governm ent protects those interests by regulating
private land management. Normal, necessary, and legal uses o f land can be stopped if these uses
harm endangered species. On the other hand, as Lueck (1995) show ed, private landowners can,
in effect, o w n a public wildlife population if his or her property is large enough to encompass the
range o f the population. In this chapter, I show how landowners and conservationists have
divided these values in the terms of their agreements.
This overlap was seen by the first conservationists. Theodore Roosevelt saw "game
preservation" happening either by landed proprietors maintaining private reserves "with a sense
of public spirit and due regard for the interests and feelings of others" or by the "far preferable
and more democratic w ay ... by a system o f public preserves" (quoted by Leopold 1933:18). The
heart o f the problem —the overlap in interests—was described by Leopold (1949:213): "When the
private landowner is asked to perform som e unprofitable act for the good o f the community, he
today assents only with outstretched palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but
{
j'
|

when it costs only fore-thought, open-m indedness, or time, the issue is at least debatable."
Sorting out the overlapping interests in land is a problem of separating them so each
party can benefit from the values they w a n t It is like the common parable o f the orange: one

r

5

person w ants the rind as an ingredient in a cake, the other wants the fruit, so cutting the orange in
half w ill not satisfy their interests, but peeling it will. In one of the cases in this study, a land
owner n eeded to impound water for irrigation and release it back to a stream. Conservationists
com plained that water released over the dam was too warm for salmon in the stream. They

f

resolved the problem by agreeing that the landowner would release water from under the dam,

|
t

which w ou ld be cooler than water from over the top.

f

Types of Agreements

t

The T ypes of Agreements I describe vary in simplicity and legality, giving multiple

t

view s o f h ow people are arranging their com peting interests (Table 2). Below, I describe a set of

[

exam ple cases proceeding from the sim plest ownership arrangement to more com plex arrange-

!

ments involving multiple people. Along the way I point out the differences between legally

[

binding and non-binding agreements. In the next section. Factors in the T ypology (page 57), I

'

generalize the differences among the main types of agreement here into T ypes o f O wnership
(page 58) and Elements o f Exchange (page 59).
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Table 2. Main Types of Agreements.

Registry Agreement: a handshake agreem ent betw een landowner and
conservationist to protect or m anage a feature of a private tract.

Reward and Compensation: a conservation group pays a landowner
when a predator dens or dam ages livestock on a private tract.

Lease: a landowner sells near-complete ownership rights to his or her
land to another “person” for a limited time.

Cost-share: a public agency shares with a landowner the cost of a land
m anagem ent project.

Easement and Estate Management Agreements: a landowner donates
m anagem ent rights to a conservation group, or otherwise lowers
the value of his or her property, in exchange for tax relief.

Franchise: a landowner buys near-complete ownership of wildlife from a
state agency in exchange for limited a c c e ss and m anagem ent
rights given to the state.

Private Management: a private group or landowner receives limited
(
I

rights to m anage a species of wildlife, for exam ple, by raising a
captive population for release in the wild.

|
!
|

Exemptions: the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service exem pts landowners

£

i
f
*
I
I
l
f.

and other private citizens from regulations designed to protect
endangered and threatened species.

Working Together and Miscellany: several instances of agreem ent take
place among people who have gathered to reach consensus or
collaborate on som e set of rival interests. Land owners and managers som etim es alter their practices in accord with the group and
other times will invest labor, money, equipm ent, and other resources in projects shared by other m em bers of the group.

Except for Franchise, Estate Management Agreement, and Exemptions, the name of each
type w ould be recognized by anyone involved with that type of agreement. I needed to apply the
names for Franchise, Estate Management Agreement, and Exemptions because people in the field
talked only about specific exam ples of these and did not have a nam e for the category. Also, I
have left out of this list fee-sim ple purchase of land. Purchases are used to achieve conservation
goals, but I focused this study on solutions to conservation problems that leave the private sector
substantially involved.
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These are the headings in my typology of agreement, below each one is a w ide space for
individuality. Instead o f trying to specify the typology to that level, I present the factors by which
agreements differ. First I review the headings, pointing out their differences, and concepts they
feature, then I describe the coding schem e I used to define their differences. This scheme can be
used to describe individual agreements.

Registry Agreements
The Nature Conservancy has a "Registry Program" to keep track of landowners w'ho
have registered the existence o f a rare plant or other feature o f the land that the landowner is
protecting, maintaining, or developing (Hoose 1981). Each registry landowner has agreed with
TNC, w hich may be more or less specifically defined in writing, to protect "highly significant
natural features critical to the preservation of natural diversity," or som ething to that effect.
Normally, the agreem ent is consummated with som e official recognition of the landowner in the
form of a plaque, certificate, or sign for the property, and the agreem ent is maintained through
subsequent attempts to remain in touch.
N otice that the Conservancy brokers this deal between its members (the customers) and
the landowners (the suppliers). The brokering role o f the conservation party to voluntary agree
ments is repeated in the following examples. The distinction is important because it highlights
the fact that these agreements are w ays to resolve problems o f public goods; on the other hand,
the distinction is not so important because the conservationist and the landowner are the parties
!

who directly negotiate. Conservationists make their case to "customers" extensively, not inten-

]

sively, by advertising and mailing.

I

"Registry" is the sim plest agreement I found: two parties are involved and nothing is

\

legally binding. N o control of land is transferred in the initial agreement, but som e costs incurred

|

can be seen as part o f establishing control through a future contract TNC is aware that such

|

agreements can im prove prospects o f securing binding legal agreements in the management of

I

the land. Costs arise in delivering impressive plaques and signs and hiring effective negotiators

I

to meet wdth landowners initially to establish the agreement and then subsequently to maintain

t

the relationship.

|

Rewards and Compensation

|

In Montana, w hen a landowmer's property is either dam aged by w olves or grizzly bears,

I

the non-profit group Defenders o f Wildlife will pay for the damage. Defenders also will pay a

[

"reward" o f S5,000 to landowners on whose property a w olf pair produces pups. Although

:

Defenders represents its membership, who as I mentioned above are part of the agreement, think

'

of this as another sim ple, two-party, non-binding agreement. Rewards and Compensation
agreements involve at least two concepts that distinguish it from Registry Agreements: economic
property rights, and reciprocity.
Econom ic pro p erty rights, unlike legal property rights, are the rights a person can actu
ally protect, not the ones he or she is entitled to by law'. The difference is between de facto and de
jure rights. One noteworthy feature of Defenders’ deal is that he is buying som ething the land

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

51

owner does not legally have to sell. It would be a violation o f the Endangered Species Act for a
landowner to disrupt the den of an endangered species, but it is within the landowner's ability to
do so. Cheung (1970) distinguished property rights and econom ic property rights: the latter
describes not w hat is legally owned, but what can be controlled, or "one's ability to exercise
choices over a good" (Allen 1991:3). Basically, your econom ic property right is defined by your
ability to deter thieves.
Defenders calls its programs rewards and compensations, and there is no binding legal
requirement that the landowners do anything in return, but they hope they have bought som e
tolerance. "We just have to believe that ranchers will think, 'Geez, wolves aren't so bad to have
around.'"
R eciprocity refers to what Coase (1960) called the reciprocal nature of problems o f social
cost. Moral considerations aside, Coase argued, a polluter could pay neighbors for the right to
clean air, or the neighbors could pay the polluter for the right to pollute. Defenders recognizes that
the payments could go either w ay and, because landowners have economic property rights to
wolves. Defenders tries to buy these economic property rights to kill wolves.
Rewards and Compensation are more complex also because more checking is required to
be sure that all paym ents are deserving and so, as a representative of Defenders says, "we can
protect the integrity of the fund." In the case of a reward, Defenders pays a rancher $5,000 after
the litter reaches approxim ately 10 months of age. Documentation of the exchange is accom
plished by a visit to the den-area by Defenders personnel. Defenders, in turn, reports to its con\
f

tributors through its various publications,

h

f
i

Lease
A lease is a formalized version o f the agreements already described; leases show how

|

these sim ple agreements can become more complex. A Registry Agreement resembles the

|

Conservation Reserve and Adopt-A-Pothole Programs I describe below, and Defenders' reward

|

program resembles the lease a horse-owner would pay for stabling his or her animal on a

|

neighbor's land (though I w ill not describe those details). The final example is of a hunting lease,

|

which is a thought-provoking model for endangered species conservation.

r
IV

|
3

Conservation Reserve
The Conservation Reserve Program gives the Department of Agriculture the m oney to lease

3

access and m anagem ent rights from private landowners. For monthly lease payments, the

;

government specifies the cover crop that will retire the cropland. The attribute of land traded is
the cropland, by which I refer to the capacity of the land to produce a crop. Between the Depart
ment of Agriculture and the taxpayers it represents, and w hose m oney it spends, the attribute of
land traded is the stability of the soil, or the condition of land opposite of erodibility.
Part of the greater complexity of this lease is in the role of a government agency. Ameri
can citizens expressed a demand for stable soil through the policy process resulting in the Food
Security Act of 1985 and the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990. These laws
established the Conservation Reserve Program as a way for the Department of Agriculture to
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stabilize soil for taxpayers. The Department satisfies taxpayers by leasing the use of arable land
from farmers so that the land can be planted in such a way as to elim inate erosion. Separation
between the attribute of land sought by conservationists (stability) and the attribute of land
traded with a landowner (cropland), is a common fact of voluntary agreements for conservation.

Adopt-a-Pothole
Adopt-a-Pothole is a similar program run by a private, non-profit conservation group, the
Delta Waterfowl Foundation. Delta leases private property from landowners who restore or
maintain upland vegetation surrounding ponds (i.e., potholes) in the prairie pothole region of
southern Alberta and the north-centred United States. The customers whom Delta represents are
contributors who intend to hunt these species during the southward migration. Higher nesting
success is assumed to result from promoting specified nesting habitat.
Delta demonstrates its service to contributors (production of ducks) to a greater extent
than did the Department of Agriculture in demonstrating conservation o f soil. Instead of assum
ing that the use of the land creates the desired product. Delta defines the existence of ducks by a
direct measure. Surveys of duck production, though not an exact measurement, define the
attribute directly. In fact. Delta uses this fact as a primary selling point for their program. The
promotional brochure, "A dopt A Pothole and together w e can bring back the ducks" (Delta
1993a), boasts, "Finally. A proven action program to fill the flyways" (emphasis in original).
Whereas the basis for the proof could be debated by any scientist, the argument is that desired
t

results are being measured directly.

I

The method of exchange is by reporting the results of surveys o f waterfowl nests and

|

introducing landowners to contributors (Delta 1993b). Individuals w ho contribute to the pro-

t

gram receive an aerial photograph of a wetland they have "adopted" and receive periodic reports

|

on the status o f waterfowl production on the prairies. These reports adm it that "waterfowl

Si

|

surveying in not an exact science" (Delta 1993b), but list estim ates of duckling production for a

$

given acreage. The Adopt-A-Pothole report describes the goals, background, implementation,

?

budget, future plans, and data on costs and acres covered by contract A single-page report, the

\

W aterfowl Report, presents on the first side a verbal summary of recent events pertinent to the

|

program. On the back side, tables list estimates of duckling production and totals of acres

|

included in the program. The Adopt-A-Pothole report is distributed semi-annually, and the

1

waterfow l report quarterly.

;

As in the Conservation Reserve contract, the conservationist pays the landowner for the

\

right to direct the cultivation o f land. Delta pays a higher rate to landowners whose land needs

•

cropland, is defined to the sam e extent as in Conservation Reserve: that approved vegetation is

replanting instead of sim ply letting existing vegetation grow. The managed attribute of land,
established and maintained acceptably. At this level of definition. Delta distinguishes between
land that must be planted and land only to be left undeveloped. A higher rental rate is offered for
cropland seeded to grass ($ 3 0 /acre) than for native, existing grassland ($ 7 / acre). The higher rate
is supposed to cover the cost o f seeding, which makes sense, but what if a higher rate was paid
for native grassland to create an incentive to protect it?
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The method and timing of completing the exchange are defined similarly to Conservation
Reserve: site visits to determine compliance and 5-year contracts, 50% of annual payment by 1
May, and the balance on 1 November.

Hunting Leases
Hunting leases are voluntarily agreements designed to capture the value of an even less
tangible feature o f land than is population viability (e.g, Delta, Defenders), soil stability (e.g.,
Conservation Reserve), or biodiversity (e.g.. Conservancy). In each of those previous cases, the
customer wanted som ething that could conceivably be measured with the right equipment, skill,
and m oney. In this case, the customer is after an enjoyable hunting experience: som ething of
which only he or she can be the judge.
The consulting team of Crawford and Bourland arranges hunting leases. In these con
tracts, the landowner sells experiences by selling the opportunity to have the experience. The
opportunity is defined by access, management, and exclusion. A hunter or a hunting club
receives "all rights of ingress and egress to and from the Leased Premises" to the extent that the
club members and their guests hunt and engage only in related activities and that they remain in
the good graces of the property owner (the contract defines these points with extensive text).
T he club also gets the right to manage the land to enhance w ildlife populations. Club
members can plant food plants and install feeders "where appropriate" and, again, within
hunting regulations.
Finally, the club can exclude other hunters — and only other hunters — from the prop
erty. The "LESSOR, its employees, licensees, agents and contractors reserves and shall have the
unrestricted right o f ingress and egress from the LEASED PREMISES."

Endangered Species Leases
Endangered Species Leases have been agreed to in one case that I described. The Texas
Parks and W ildlife Department has entered into leases with landowners as a means toward
recovering the endangered Attwater's Prairie Chicken. These agreements give the state access to
the property for "legitimate purposes" and to limit the number o f cow s on the property. Other
terms resemble those of the hunting lease.
A notable difference among these agreements is that som e identify directly the values of
interest to the parties, and others do not. The number of cows on a tract may relate closely to the
likelihood that prairie chickens will persist, or they m ay not. In Conservation Reserve, cover types
probably relate very w ell to reduction in sediment. A hunting lease cannot spell out the quality of
the experience, but by giving the hunters near-complete ownership of the land, they obtain a lot
of control over the circumstances, which influence the quality of the experience. The sam e
strategy applies to endangered species leases.

Cost-shares
When landowners and conservationists collaborate to restore a stream channel, as they
have done several times in the Blackfoot Valley of western Montana, the agreement transpires in
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a relatively short time. In what is titled a "wildlife extension agreement," terms describe what the
project will accom plish, how much money, equipment, and labor w ill be supplied by each party,
and also what land m anagem ent will occur after the project is com plete.
These agreem ents rely on the collaboration of the landow ner and conservationist to
gather the labor and capital, and also to measure the results. The tw o plan and carry out the
project together, allow ing for constant exchange of ideas and negotiation of values. In the end,
they know how w ell the project meets their interests because they had the chance throughout to
direct it, and they have shared management rights to the property insofar as the project improves
it.

Easement and Estate Management
Conservation easements are a popular and w ell-know n means of reaching voluntary
agreement with a landowner for conservation purposes. The easem ent contract is more com plex
than previous exam ples o f agreements as it includes the landowner, a conservation group, and
the federal governm ent. Easements also are a common part of estate management strategies,
which include several other examples of agreem ent The com plexity of these agreements arises in
tax law.
An easem ent enables a conservationist to buy m anagem ent rights to only those parts of a
tract that directly influence the conservation value of the property. Those parts of the tract are
described as the "ecological and esthetic features" and m anaging them typically means control?

ling the building o f hom es or other buildings, and developing rangeland and timberland. The

1

Conservancy and sm aller land trusts use easements often, perhaps because it is the best tool to

I

protect assem blages, or communities, of living and non-living resources. The mission of the

|

Conservanaj is "to preserve plants, animals and natural com m unities that represent the diversity

|

of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive" (TNC : back cover). In a

i

word, the product o f the Conservanaj operations is biodiversity (i.e., variety in life forms and life

|

processes).

j

The parties joining the Conservancy in contracts are its supporters and the private owners

|

of land useful for maintaining or restoring biodiversity. Supporters is a general term encompass-

|

ing contributors to the Conservancy and government agencies w ho purchase land from the Conser-

f

vanaj w hen it opts to buy property rather than obtain an easem ent from the original owner,

r
I

The extent to which biodiversity and developm ent rights are traded varies w idely in the
Conservancy transactions. Biodiversity in a particular transaction could be a single population or

|

an area o f habitat. Developm ent rights, ranging from specific modifications such as m ow ing to

•

packages of rights, could be secured by promise, conservation easem ent, or fee-title purchase of
the land. Combinations of these three ways of controlling developm ent rights with various
definitions of biodiversity generate many individual arrangements. Descriptions of these ar
rangements are supplied to supporters in magazines and newsletters as evidence of biodiversity
protection.
Estate m anagem ent agreements do not all pertain directly to the conservation value of
land, but they are marketed by land trusts as strategies that keep small private landowning
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families in possession of their rural land. "Cows not Condos!" is the rallying cry behind this idea,
as one bumper sticker reads. There are a number of publications that describe these, including
Preserving Family Lands (Small 1992) and Conservation Options: a landowner's guide (Alliance
1993).

Franchise
I named this category m yself because I could not find a name for it used by the people
who have reached this kind of agreement. Professional conservationists, including one of my
colleagues (Arha 1997), call them Private Land/Public Wildlife programs. The name is apt, and
introduces som e of the complexity, but it is, basically, a franchise agreem ent Franchise is the
right to market a product or service, often exclusive for a specified area, as granted by a manufac
turer or company. Consider state fish and wildlife agencies as manufacturers in the business of
gam e wildlife. To hunt, a hunter must buy a right from the agency in the form o f a hunting tag.
Franchise agreements enable a landowner to purchase the tag-selling operation from the agency
under limitations. This is analogous to a restaurateur buying the menu, decor, name, logo, etc.,
from a national chain like Red Lobster and setting up a business of his or her own.

Private Management
Under some conditions and limitations, private landowners and other private persons
;

can receive rights to manage wildlife. In three examples I described, two involved private groups

i

raising endangered wildlife in captivity, and one company that assumed managem ent of a rare

5

fish found on company lands. The difference between Private Mangement and Franchise is

f

debatable; I distinguish the two because access and exclusion in Private M anagement are incidental to the intentional transfer of management rights. Also, the model of Private Management for

II

endangered species would not always have a retail opportunity. An agency could use this m odel

i

to contract with private landowners to do the same job an agency would do on public land. In

f

this case. Private Management w ould be a private delivery of a public service, which differs from

«
?
f%

Franchise.

|

Exemptions

I

Exemptions are pseudo-voluntary agreements in which a regulation is relaxed in ex-

l:

change for conservation practiced by the landowner. This is the jumping-off point from the old

|

m odel of conservation to the new one. Regulation is the involuntary alternative to agreement.

|

Habitat Conservation Plans, as described by endangered species regulations (50 CFR17.22(b)(l)),

\

can w in for a landowner a permits for "incidental take" of a species when their otherwise lawful

i

activity w ould result in a taking o f a threatened or endangered species. Another exam ple is the
provision in the Endangered Species Act §10 for special rules covering the taking of animals
returned to their historic range. These "non-essential/experimental" populations can be pro
tected with regulations tailored to the species and the reintroduction situation. The North
American wolves, the red and the grey, both have been reintroduced under these provisions. The
grizzly bear is proposed for reintroduction with such a rule (USDI1997), and a number of lesscontroversial species have also been managed this way.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

56
The Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service are the only legal
entities with authority to intervene physically with endangered species or to grant permits for this
authority. M ost of the same manipulation of endangered animals conducted by Fish and Wildlife
personnel in the course of recovering the species would constitute harm if executed by unautho
rized people. This situation defines a right of access to endangered species. Personnel of the U. S.
Fish and Wildlife Service Red W olf Recovery Program used the Endangered Species Act to
transfer this right of access, under limited conditions, to hunters and trappers in the area o f a
reintroduction project in coastal North Carolina.
When planning the second attempted mainland reintroduction of red w olves (eventually,
it was the first successful attempt). Red Wolf Program personnel concentrated their efforts on
engendering support for the project (Moore and Smith 1991, Schildwachter 1994). Their efforts
identified access to traditional hunting and trapping lands by local citizens as an issue of major
concern in the community. Requiring cooperation of local citizens and facing com mitment to the
American public as the customer of recovery efforts. Red Wolf Program personnel decided that
permitting continued hunting and trapping in the area o f the reintroduction was the best way to
proceed with the project. Special, less-restrictive prohibitions on human activities in the project
area were written under authority o f the Endangered Species Act that forgave incidental harm to
red w olves w hen the incident was reported (Parker and Phillips 1991).
The experimental status proscribed by the special regulations transferred from the Red
Wolf Program to recreationists in the area the legal right to trap or shoot reintroduced red wolves
accidentally. The attribute is access to the animals, defined to the extent that access is taken
1

incidentally in the judgement of the Red Wolf Program, and is reported immediately. The ex-

l

change occurs upon the report of a hunter, trapper, or motorist who incidentally traps, injures or

h

kills a red wolf.

|

Miscellany: working together and voluntary compliance

e
s

|

Multi-party, or umbrella, groups seem to be rising in popularity. They are enough of a

jr

I

presence that Sierra Club President Mike McCloskey has publicized his concern about them

|

(McCloskey 1996). Sometimes these work collaboratively, as the Black Bear Conservation Com-

i

mittee has, to develop a restoration plan and work toward a common objective. Other cases, like

f

Project SPIARE, work more cooperatively, finding opportunities to help one another. The variety

[

of purposes for which these groups form is so w ide that a typology focused only on groups is

\

possible. The points about working together that are relevant to endangered species conservation

v

by voluntary agreement are: groups create rules for agreement, groups distribute costs, and
groups struggle to decide w ho belongs.

Rules of Agreement
The m ost basic transaction, perhaps buying food, is defined by the currency, price tags,
check-out counters, and receipts am ong other things. The agreement reached by a customer and
a grocer when the customer brings a loaf of bread to the counter is so clearly defined that they
need not speak. When they do speak, the talk is limited to polite exchange of good wishes.
Compared with this example, an agreement on conserving wildlife has no rules at all. Wildlife on

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

57

private land are not always visible, and the real elem ent of interest, the chance the w ildlife will
persist, is invisible. There is no easy way to measure either the presence of w ildlife or the likeli
hood it w ill persist, and there are no standard times or places to pay a landowner for promoting
it. This lack of rules promotes a lot o f talk. In Chapter 4 , 1 describe this talk in detail; for now, my
point is only that groups "working together" talk to establish rules o f agreement.

Distributing Cost
In Maine, the members of Project SHARE discovered that several o f them had valuable
parts to a conservation project and, working together, could piece them together. In the case of
building a fish ladder where an impassible dam stood, one member knew a cement-contractor,
another member had the design for the ladder, the group raised m oney for concrete and wood,
and another member had volunteers who could build i t Together, they put together the equip
ment, supplies, labor, and expertise and shared the cost.

Deciding Who Belongs
D eciding who belongs is w hat distinguishes collaboration from consensus in the mind of
Matt McKinney, director of the Montana Consensus Council. He told me in person, and has
published, his v iew that unless everyone with an interest in the discussion is involved, you are
collaborating. W hen all interested parties are present and they agree, then you have consensus.
The people I spoke to who work in groups noted that som e people are "extreme" and w ill attend
meetings only to prevent agreem ent To proceed, these people may need to be denied member\

ship in the agreem ent group.

i

Factors in the Typology

|

The main types of agreement just described are distinguished by their prominent fea-

|

tures: a handshake agreement w ithout legal bond, a payment for dam age not legally required, a

|

donation of developm ent rights, and so on. Details for each type, however, more fully describe

T

the structure o f these agreements and the possibilities for combining and interchanging their

I

parts to create n ew agreements. Clues to these details are the brokering role played by the

i-

conservation interest in each type, and the differences between w hat is sought after and what is

|

paid for, and som e other elements. Economic scholarship has proposed som e description and

:

explanation for these clues and I apply that work here. On the basis o f transaction-cost econom-

1

ics, I have described agreements in terms of C om plexity o f O w nership, T ypes o f O w nership,

s

and Elements o f Exchange.
The basis of this comparative analysis is transaction-cost econom ics, w hich compares the
ways exchanges are arranged according to the cost of establishing and protecting property rights.
Theoretically, people will always settle on the transactions of least cost. Typically, a transaction
cost analysis w ill compare the size of transaction costs among several alternative arrangements of
the same transaction. That analysis could follow mine; here, I stopped at defining the alternative
arrangements already used by which landowners agree to perform som e unprofitable act of
conservation for the public.
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Schlager and Ostxom (1992) described how levels o f ownership rights com pose com plete
ownership and these can be divided and separated. Allen (1991) described the elements of
transactions, and C heung (1970) distinguished between de facto and de jure rights of ownership.
Combining these concepts, I have drawn the structure of Market Conservation. I also looked for
the meaning of Market Conservation and found that it is centrally about interests in land and that
in the cases I exam ined closely, a process for reaching agreem ent w as evident. This process leads
from the first contact between a conservationist and a landowner to the completion of a deal and
living with it.

Complexity of Ownership
Lueck (1995) sh ow ed that ownership o f wildlife m ixes ownership of land, a private good,
with ownership of wildlife, a mainly public good, to produce situations more complex than the
sim ple private-land/public-w ildlife dichotomy. Many cases of local, voluntary, and informal
agreement are docum ented for ocean fisheries. On land, an extra elem ent of complexity is added
by Iandownership.

Types of Ownership
Ownership often is associated with the word "interest" O ne definition of "interest" is,
"A right or claim to something." This word figures prominently in w hat people say about
agreement, as I w ill describe more fully in the next section. If an interest is a right or claim to
1
1
r
i
i
I
I

I

something, then full interest should be complete right or claim. A hunter has som e right to gam e
wildlife, but the wildlife, w e say, is publicly owned. The holder o f a conservation easement has
claim to access and developm ent rights on another person's land. There should be a way to
describe stages of ownership leading from none to full. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) proposed
such a schem e, railing full owners "owner", and lesser owners proprietors, managers, and users,
in descending order (Table 3).

i
i

{
|
j
I
t

?
\
|
!

The rights entailed by ownership categories are as follow s.

A ccess: the right to enter a defined physical property. I m odified this definition so access to
non-land properties could be coded. For example, a hunter buys from a state agency the
right to "access" a deer by killing it and taking it hom e, or, as it often is described in
regulations, "reducing it to possession." In order to hunt, the hunter also needs access to
gamelands. This distinction is elaborated below.

Withdrawal: The right to obtain the "products" o f a resource (e.g., catch fish, appropriate
water, etc.). Schlager and Ostrom (1992), writing about fisheries classified fish as a
product of the area of water defined as the fishery. I have separated the fish as a separate
good.

Management: The rights to (1) regulate internal use patterns and (2) improve the resource
(or otherwise change it).

Exclusion: The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be
transferred.

Alienation: The right to sell or lease either Management or Exclusion rights.
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This explains how the hunter claims ownership o f wildlife, and how the easement holder
claims ownership o f developm ent rights; later, I will apply it to all the cases. A person becomes a
hunter (in the legal sense) when he or she buys a hunting license. This license is a limited prop
erty right to chase, kill, and take home game wildlife. Embodied in the license are the regulations
that define which w ildlife are game, which individuals can be taken, w hat equipm ent and
techniques may be used in the h u n t The license gives the hunter the right o f "access and with
drawal" to wildlife. Most conservation easements also convey access and withdrawal rights, but
their purpose is to transfer the right of changing the property to som eone w ho w ill not exercise
that right. Armed with this right to "regulate internal u se patterns," the holder o f the easement is
a manager.

Table 3. Ownership categories defined by levels of ownership rights (Schlager
and Ostrom 1992).

A ccess
and withdrawal

|

|

Owner
X

Proprietor
X

M anagem ent

X

X

Exclusion

X

X

Alienation

X

M anager
X

User
X

X

Elements of Exchange
In transferring different ownership rights, agreements often are very specific about such

I

questions as w ho, what, where, when, and how these rights are transferred. There should be, and

fj

is, a schem e describing these also. Allen (1991:14) proposed that "every contract implicitly or

t

explicitly defines the attributes traded, the extent, timing, and form of measurement, and the
residual claimants." These components of each exchange are defined as follows:

i

I

Parties: the parties involved in a voluntary transaction w ho bear the costs and gain the

;

profits from exchange; in economic terms, the residual claimants.

I

Good: any tradable personal property, service, or other useful thing.

I

Attribute: the feature of a good that is measured in a transaction; for exam ple, land can be
used for a hunting opportunity and for many overlapping purposes as well. Land
supports livestock, wildlife, and hunting experiences. Ranchers do not suspend their
ranching operation during the hunting season, but, above a certain stocking of cattle, the
land w ould become unsuitable for most hunters. Recovery of endangered species is
another purpose to which land can be dedicated, and also one that does not necessarily
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conflict with simultaneous uses of land. Because land carries many non-rival attributes, a
particular tract conceivably couid be a ranch, a hunting area, and a part of a recover}'
program simultaneously.

Extent: the degree to which the attribute is measured. A landowner sells a hunter access to
gam e lands. Access can be defined as showing up (e.g., parking within sight of the
landowner's house, or checking in and out of the property at the landowner's house, or
etc.); or spending a measured amount of time on the property (e.g., checking in and out
before 12 noon to qualify for the half-day price); or killing a certain type of animal while
on the property.

Method: the means of measuring the attribute. This is often related to the extent, but differs
in that this is what is done, not what is sou gh t W eighing by scale is a com mon method of
determining value. In wildlife conservation, measuring value for a particular attribute
m ight mean determining the presence of an animal in an area (e.g., using scent stations,
railing and visual surveys, etc.). Furthermore, habitat-quality could be evaluated by
m easuring quantities of food, water, shelter, and space either by ground survey or by
analysis of photographic images of the land surface taken from airplane or satellite.
Population parameters can be estimated by harvesting, trap-and-release, and radio
telemetry.

Timing: the order of measurement, delivery, and paym ent
Combining these three ideas — levels of ownership, complexify o f ownership, and
elem ents of transactions — I created a coding scheme to describe voluntary agreements. These
descriptions, and the typology can be used to (1) classify cases for later study o f transaction cost,
ease, conservation effectiveness, etc., and (2) prompt creativity in devising new agreements by
using the typology as a heuristic device.
|

|

Defining Attributes and Extents
In any taxonomic exercise — that is, assigning objects to categories— there is bound to be

|

disagreement. Attributes and extents caused me the greatest difficulty, so I will clarify these

I
f
|

elem ents here. Both elements define how closely a deal reflects the interest of the traders. The
attribute is the part of the good that is measured, and the extent is the degree to which the at-

t
£
{

tribute is measured.
The attributes in these agreements almost never exactly match the interest o f the traders.

|

For exam ple. Delta Waterfowl Foundation is interested in waterfowl populations, but in their

I

contract they measure habitat. If Delta could afford to measure waterfowl populations, then they

j
j

could choose an attribute that matches their interest.
The extent is the degree to which the attribute is measured. By measuring habitat, Delta
checks w hether or not grasses are growing. To be more specific, they could require that certain
kinds of grasses grow in certain amounts on each acre.

Economic Details of Agreement
M ost people who reached agreement in these cases traded attributes o f land and wildlife
species, though som e dealt in water rights and even genes. The following sections elaborate on
the main types of agreement and their details. Each section contains one case-table for each
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agreement, depicting O wnership Categories (as per Table 3, p. 59), and Elements of Exchange (as
per p. 59). The case-tables comprise a Schematic o f O w nership and a Report o f the Elements o f
Exchange.

Schematic of Ownership
The first part o f each case-table shows which levels of ownership are transferred from
whom to whom . For exam ple, a Registry Agreement (Table 5) transfers three levels from the
landowner to the conservationist (Table 4).
Table 4. Example Schematic of Ownership, the case of a Registry Agreement.
LAND
A ccess/W ithdraw al
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
—
X
X

C onservationist
X
X
^
X

Report o f Elements of Exchange
The next part o f each case-table reports the elements of the exchange. The elements
'

appear as 4 narrative descriptions, one for each level o f ownership. The narrative following each

|

ownership heading identifies in boldface (continuing w ith the exam ple of a Registry Agreement

I
j-

(Table 6)):

I
|

(1) The parties, the rights transferred, and good involved, e.g., "Landowner
transfers Access and W ithdrawal rights over Land to Conservationist"
(2) The attribute and extent, e.g., "For the attribute o f ecological and esthetic
features and to the extent that the conservationist can inspect and study the ecological and

I

esthetic features"
(3) The m ethod and timing of the exchange, e.g., "By patrol, m ust give notice
before arriving"
Patrol is the term I use to describe the most common method of measuring exchanges.
This means a regular or repeated inspection of an area. M ost agreements about land manage
ment rely on patrols because, I suspect, most land management is visible and patrol is the cheap
est w ay to ensure it is carried out. Another method of measuring is "collaboration." By working
together on a project, the parties see all along how it develops and understand w hy it ends up the
way it does.
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Registry
In form, the registry agreement matches the easem ent agreement (see Table 14, page 68).
The difference is that registry agreements are not binding.
Registry agreements, like easements, specify features o f the land that are to be protected
or managed. For exam ple, a landowner who harbors a sm all patch of a rare plant w ou ld agree to
mow, or not m ow , that patch depending on whether m ow ing helped it survive.

Table 5. A Registry Agreement, case of The Nature Conservancy
LAND
A ccess/W ithdraw al
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
—
X
—
X
—
X

C onservationist
►

X
X

^

X

A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: L an d o w n er transfers A ccess an d W ithdraw al rights over Land to C o n se rv a tio n ist
For th e a ttrib u te o f ecological and esthetic features and to the e xte n t th a t the conservationist can inspect and
study th e ecological and esthetic features
B y patrol, m ust give notice before arriving
M a n a g e m e n t L a n d o w n e r transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C o n serv atio n ist
For th e a ttrib u te o f ecological and esthetic features and to the e xte n t th a t the landowner follows the
conservationist's instructions for managing these features
B y patrol during term of agreem ent

i

E xclusion: L a n d o w n e r transfers E xclusion rights over Land to C o n se rv a tio n ist
For th e a ttrib u te o f ecological and esthetic features and to the e xte n t th a t management instructions may
entail restricting access.
B y patrol during term of the agreem ent
A lienation: L a n d o w n er holds A lienation rights over Land

I

Reward and Compensation

I
£
^

W hen com pensatin g a landowner for his or her livestock killed by a predator, Defenders
of W ildlife is trading in rights to a species: either gray w olves grizzly bears. The trade involves
only access and withdrawal rights because Defenders has focused their intent on the chance that
w olves occasionally kill livestock.
Defenders takes responsibility for livestock that are vulnerable to wolves to the extent
that if a professional biologist determines that wolves killed the cow (or sheep, or whatever), they
will pay the value of that animal. There is some disagreement between ranchers and Defenders
over the appropriate am ount to pay: ranchers want the full future value. Defenders pays current
value.
N ote the similarity between this compensation agreem ent and the purchase of a hunting
license. A hunter buys rights to access game populations and withdraw a certain am ount of
individuals. The differences here begin with Defenders not having a legal property right to the
livestock, nor a legal liability for the wolves.
When rew arding a landowner for harboring a successful den of grey w olves. Defenders
engages a sim ilar transaction. Defenders again assumes liability for wolves by paying a rental fee
to landowners that harbor a successful den.

,

j!
£
|
;
<
\
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Table 6. Reward and Compensation Agreements, the case of Defenders of
Wildlife. A. Compensation. B. Reward.
SPECIES
Access/Withdrawal
Management
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

Conservationist
X

W

A. COMPENSATION
A ccess an d W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers de facto A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over S p e c ie s to C o n se rv a 
tionist
For the a ttrib u te o f predatory habits to the extent th a t wolves kill livestock
B y professional judgem ent while cau se of death is identifiable
M an ag em en t L andow ner holds d e facto M anagem ent rights over S p e c ie s
Exclusion: L andow ner holds de facto E xclusion rights over S p e c ie s
Alienation: L andow ner holds de facto A lienation rights over S p e c ie s

B. REWARD
A ccess a n d W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers de facto A c ce ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over S p e c ie s to C o n serv a
tionist
For the a ttrib u te o f reproductive su ccess and to the e xte n t th a t a den succeeds, with pups surviving at 10
months of age
B y site visit after 10 months
|

M an ag em en t L andow ner holds d e facto M anagem ent rights over S p e c ie s

r
I

Exclusion: L andow ner holds de facto E xclusion rights over S p e c ie s
Alienation: L andow ner holds de facto A lienation rights over S p e c ie s

1

I
By requiring the den to produce pups. Defenders makes survival, or fitness the attribute of
the species that is traded. Unfit w olves would lose for the landowner his or her reward payment,
but the offer creates an incentive for the landowner to improve denning conditions.
Based on their know ledge of w olf life-history, Defenders declares the den successful when
the pups are 10 months old.

Lease
Leases may be the most common form of agreement along with easements. Perhaps
because they are common, they occur in wider variety. I present here one hunting lease and one
lease for endangered species habitat.
When a hunting club leases private property (Table 7), it purchases near-complete
ownership of the land. The limits on the club's ownership are in the rights they buy (all rights
except alienation), and in the attributes and extents of those rights.
Access to the property, for example, is focused on the land's suitability for hunting. The
hunters are there because it is as good a place to hunt as they can afford (probably) and they enter
the property either to hunt or to improve the hunting quality by improving game habitat or som e
similar job. In the words of the lease, "LESSOR does hereby lease to and let unto LESSEE, for the
rentals and term, and subject to the reservations and conditions hereinafter set forth, the exclusive
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Table 7. A Lease, the case of Crawford and Bourland Consulting Foresters
LAND
Access/Withdrawal
M anagement
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

^
>
>

Conservationist
X
X
X

A cce ss a n d W ithdraw al: L andow ner transfers A c c ess a n d W ithdraw al rights over Land to C o n se rv a tio n ist (i.e.. a
hunting club)
For th e attrib u te o f gamelands and to the e xte nt th a t the club is doing hunting-relating things while on the
property and obeying all restrictions such a s camping in approved places and driving only on approved roads
B y patrol during the term of the agreem ent
M an ag e m en t L an d o w n er transfers M anagem ent rights over L and to C onserv atio n ist (i.e.. a hunting club)
For the a ttrib u te o f gamelands and to the exte nt th a t the club can plant food plots and install feeders where
appropriate and approved by landowner
B y patrol during term of agreem ent
Exclusion: L an d o w n er transfers E xclusion rights over L and to C o n serv atio n ist (i.e., a hunting club)
For the a ttrib u te o f gamelands and to the e xte nt th a t th e club can post and patrol the grounds to keep out
other hunters only, and must have all signs approved by landowner, and the club cannot erect fences
B y patrol during the term of the agreem ent
Alienation: L an d o w n er holds Alienation rights over Land

3
|
y
I
|
i
|
1
.
|
I

right and privilege to hunt, pursue, capture, shoot, kill, and take away all legal types and species
of game birds and game animals..."
The extent of the hunters' access is specified as" the purpose of conducting hunting
activities upon the.Leased Premises, but does not include any other activities, including by way of
illustration but not limited to, commercial recreational developments or facilities, commercial
camping activities, commercial fishing rights, non-hunting and fishing related vehicular activities,
grazing rights, agricultural rights, or any rights to timber upon or mineral in or under said lands."
There is similar language throughout the lease to describe the extent to w hich management rights are transferred for planting food plots, and how the hunting club can exclude other
users from the property.
Compared to that elaborate wording, the Texas Parks and W ildlife lease (Table 8) is
simple. Here, the state of Texas leases access and m anagem ent rights from landowners for the
purpose o f im proving habitat for endangered Attwater's prairie chicken (Tympanuchus atpido
attwateri).

I

Table 8. A Lease, the case of Texas Parks and Wildlife

j:
j
•
i

LAND
Access/Withdrawal
Management
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

C onservationist
X
X

W
W

A cce ss a n d W ithdraw al: L andow ner transfers A c c ess a n d W ithdraw al rights over Land to S ta te A gency
For th e a ttrib u te o fn la and to the exte nt th a t the S ta te A gency is is on the property for a ‘legitimate purpose’
B y patrol, with a lump sum payment when lease is signed.
M an ag e m en t L an d o w n er transfers M anagem ent rights over L and to S ta te Agency
For the a ttrib u te o f cattle capacity and to the e x te n t th a t initial stocking can be 90 cow s/acre and not to
ex ceed 70 thereafter
B y patrol, over the term of the agreem ent
Exclusion: L an d o w n er holds Exclusion rights over Land
Alienation: L an d o w n er holds Alienation rights over Land
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The Texans manage the use of the "grazing attribute" of the land: call the grazing
attribute the capacity of cattle that can survive there. By m anaging this, Texas Parks and W ildlife
can alter the condition of the range, which is part of the habitat value for prairie chickens.
A little closer to the point, the Delta W aterfowl Foundation lease (Table 9) is based
directly on the "grass attribute" of land. Rather than contracting for the number of cow s that are
eating grass, Delta contracts for the presence of grass and leaves it to the landowner to decided
whether to establish the grass by protecting it (i.e., not m ow ing it) or by planting it. Delta sim p ly
checks to be sure it is there for ducks to nest in.
The difference in the leases of Delta and Texas Parks and Wildlife is in measuring the
exact feature o f land needed for conservation or measuring a surrogate. Another exam ple o f
contracting for a surrogate measure is the USDA C onservation Reserve Program (Table 10). In a
CRP contract, the Department of Agriculture wants to pay landowners to stabilize their soil; in
effect, USDA buys the stability of soil. To do this, how ever, they measure the "grass attribute" of
land just as Delta does.
Think o f this trade-off as "what-you-get vs. what-you-pay-for." A version of this trade
off faces conservationists who lease water. The objective o f O regon Water Trust (Table 11) and
Environmental D efen se Fund (Table 12) is to ensure the quality o f fish habitat. These groups
manage an irrigator's withdrawal o f water from a stream based on whether the irrigator fallow s
his or her land. Just as managers o f waterfowl, prairie chickens, and soil need grass or trees to
accomplish their goal, managers of fish need water. The hunting club (Table 7) in the first ex
ample o f a lease solved the problem of what-you-get vs. what-you-pay-for by contracting for
more ownership. They made the purpose of the contract explicit to the hunting rights, but
w ithout a w ay to measure the quality of hunting rights, they arranged a contract that allow ed
them to control m ore elements of the land that make or break the hunting experience.

Table 9. A Lease, the c ase of Delta Waterfowl Foundation
LAND
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

I

f
I

?
I
j

i

Landowner
X
X
X
X

C onservationist
>
X
>
X

A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: L andow ner transfers A ccess an d W ithdraw al rights over Land to C o n se rv atio n ist
For the attriubute of n/a and to the extent that the conservationist can inspect the property
B y patrol, during term of the agreem ent
M an a g e m e n t L an d o w n er transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C o n serv a tio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f capacity of land to grow vegetation and to the e xte n t tha t the landowner estab lish es or
maintains a cover crop
B y site visit (2 p er year): during the term of the contract; monthly paym ents
E xclusion: L an d o w n er holds E xclusion rights over Land
A lienation: L an d o w n er holds A lienation rights over Land

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66

Table 10. A Lease, the case of U.S. Department of Agriculture, Conservation
Reserve Program
LAND
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
—
X
—
X
X

Conservationist
>• X
► X

A c c e ss a n d W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers A c c e ss a n d W ithdrawal rights over L an d to C o n serv a tio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f n/a and to th e e xte n t th a t Conservationist can inspect th e property
B y patrol during term of the agreem ent
M an a g e m e n t L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C o n se rv a tio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f capacity of land to grow vegetation and to the exte nt th a t the landowner establishes or
maintains a cover crop
B y site visit (2 per yr) during term o f agreement
E xclusion: L andow ner holds
E xclusion rights over Land
A lienation: L an d o w n er holds
A lienation rights over Land

Table 11. A Lease, the case of Oregon Water Trust
WATER
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landow ner
X
X
X
X

^

Conservationist
X

A cc e ss a n d W ithdraw al: L andow ner transfers W ithdraw al rights over w ater to C o n se rv a tio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f quantity and to the extent th a t the landowner fallows his o r her lan d and improves
irrigation efficiency.
B y patrol over a 1-2 y ear renewable term
M an ag e m e n t L andow ner holds M anagem ent rights over w ater
E xclusion: S ta te A gency holds E xclusion rights over w ater
A lienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over water

Table 12. A Lease, the case of Environmental Defense Fund
WATER
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

>

Conservationist
X

A ccess a n d W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers W ithdraw al rights over w ater to C o n se rv a tio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f quantity (less than or equal to 16.000 acre-feet/yr) and to the e xte n t th a t the landowner
fallows land.
B y patrol.
M an a g e m e n t L andow ner holds M anagem ent rights over w ater
E xclusion: L andow ner holds E xclusion rights over water
A lienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over water

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

Cost-share
Cost-shares focus on projects: work with an obvious goal, beginning, and end. In the
USFWS Partners for W ildlife Program (Table 13), these projects typically are stream restorations,
water diversions, and fencing. A landowner and conservationist could apply this arrangement
to a previous type, such as cost sharing on a hunting lease to plant food plots, but Partners Pro
gram cost-shares differ from these by focusing the contract directly on the w ildlife habitat at
tribute o f land, which, like hunting quality, is hard to measure.
A cost-share could focus on a feature of land like buddings, and be defined as a contract
on the suitability of land for construction. However, the language of a Partners Program contract
says, "The w ildlife cooperators ((i.e„ landowners and other parties)) in signing this agreement
join as participants in a w ildlife management program and grant to the FWS the authority to
complete w ildlife habitat development, or to personally carry out wildlife m anagem ent activities
with financial or material support, as described in the attached special provisions."
Calling the parties to the agreement "cooperators" highlights this strategy for trading an
intangible value like wildlife habitat The cost-share strategy is — more than sharing just cost —
sharing the work and the evaluation of the outcome as it develops. Handling the immeasurable
value this w ay is flexible: not only is the work evaluated continually throughout the project by all

|

Table 13. A Cost-share, the case of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Partners for
Wildlife Program

V

________________________________________________________________

LAND
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
—
X
—
X
X

Conservationist
X
^
X

A c c e ss an d W ithdraw al: L an d o w n er transfers A ccess an d W ithdraw al rights over Land to F ederal Agency
For th e attrib u te o f n/a and to the extent that Agency staff are there at 'reasonable tim es'
B y patrol, for the term of the ag reem en t

|

Si
,
]

M an a g e m e n t L an d o w n er transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to F ederal A gency
For th e a ttrib u te o f wildlife habitat, and to the extent tha t a specific development is com pleted and agricultural
u se is negotiated
B y collaboration
E xclusion: L an d o w n er holds E xclusion rights over Land
A lienation: L a n d o w n er holds A lienation rights over Land

i

i
;

cooperators, but other elem ents of the exchange are negotiated specifically. The boiler-plate
language to the agreement prohibits "any agricultural use o f the tract such as livestock grazing or
haying, unless included as part of this or an amended agreement." The special provisions of
Partners Program agreements in Montana include a standard amendment that states,"Haying,
grazing, and livestock watering w ill be permitted on the area covered by this agreement." These
specific exem ptions change the extent to which management rights are conveyed from the
landowner to governm ent conservationists.
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Easement
A Partners Program agreement is used to develop a project that w ill enhance wildlife
habitat values, but an easement is used typically to prevent a development that will impair
habitat values. The Nature Conservancy and the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation are wellknown in the West for their conservation easem ents (Table 14).
Easements focus on the "ecological and aesthetic features and values" o f land. These
attributes can be defined in the easem ent either directly or by an activity that affects them. For
example, when a rare plant is one o f the features protected by an easement, it is defined by its
presence or absence. When the habitat value for a w ildlife species, such as elk, is of interest, it is
defined by guidance on how trees and forage should be managed to maximize habitat values.
Notice the extents to which easem ent attributes are defined (directly or by association)
resemble the way attributes were defined in other cases. Texas Parks and W ildlife defined prairie
chicken habitat value to the extent that regulating cattle grazing could affect it. The Partners

Table 14. An Easement, the c ase of The Nature Conservancy
LAND
Access/Withdrawal
Management
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
—
X
X
—
X

Conservationist
X
X
X

A ccess a n d W ithdrawal: L andow ner transfers A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over Land to C o n se rv a tio n ist
For the a ttribu te o f n/a and to the exte nt th a t enforce rights, study
B y patrol, notice required before visiting
M an ag em en t L andow ner transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to C onserv atio n ist
For the attribu te o f ecological and esthetic features and to the extent that the conservationist can restore
th ese features and enjoin rival u ses
B y patrol, during term of the agreem ent
Exclusion: L andow ner transfers E xclusion rights over Land to C o n serv atio n ist
For the attrib u te o f n/a and to the exte nt th a t fencing
B y patrol, during term of the agreem ent
Alienation: L andow ner holds A lienation rights over Land

Program defined wildlife habitat values to the extent that they and their cooperators could fashion
a project that, in their judgement, enhanced those values.
Easements, like hunting leases, involve more complete ownership rights. The conserva
tionist earns proprietary rights over a limited interest. The reason for the similarity probably is
the similarity in the conservationists' interests. The hunters are after an intangible, subjective goal
of hunting experience. The Conservancy and the Elk Foundation are after biodiversity and high
habitat values for elk and other wildlife. Both of these goals are complex and, practically speak
ing, immeasurable. To arrange a deal to secure these interest, these conservationists, as the hunt
club, arranged a deal earning them more extensive ownership.
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Franchise
Franchise is another type where proprietary ow nership is traded, but the arrangement is
more com plex. Colorado's Ranching for W ildlife Program, for example, involves two transac
tions and three main parties (Table 15).
Recall the concept o f the franchise in the restaurant business: the owner of a local restau
rant buys the rights to a national menu and agrees to run his or her local franchise according to
certain guidelines.
In Ranching for W ildlife, landowners buy allotments of hunting tags (i.e., lim ited prop
erty rights to wildlife) and agrees to manage his or her property according to Colorado Division
of Wildlife direction. The landowner also agrees to adm it a certain number of public hunters to
his or her land, and then he or she sells the hunting tags to paying hunters.

Table 15. A Franchise, the case of Colorado Division of Wildlife, Ranching for
Wildilfe Program. A. The land-rights in Franchise; B. The species-rights
in Franchise.
A. The Land-rights in Franchise
LAND
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

C onservationist
X
W
X

^

t
J
j

A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: L a n d o w n er transfers A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over Land to S ta te A g en cy
For th e a ttrib u te o f gam elands and to the exte nt th a t landowner h as th ese rights during the hunting sea so n
B y sign-up

)

M an a g em e n t L a n d o w n e r transfers M anagem ent rights over L and to S ta te A gency
For th e a ttrib u te o f ecological features and to the e xte n t th a t the S tate approves the landowner's m anage
m ent plan
B y professional review and site visit before agreem ent is settled.
E xclusion: L a n d o w n er holds E x clu sio n rights over Land
A lienation: L a n d o w n e r holds A lienation rights over Land

I

B. The Species-rights in Franchise
S PEC IES
Landowner
Access/Withdrawal X
— —
M a n a ge m en t
X
Exclusion
X—
Alienation
X

Conservationist
X
X
X

A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: S ta te A gency transfers A c c e ss an d W ithdraw al rights over S p e c ie s to L an d o w n er
For th e a ttrib u te o f g am e and to the extent th a t the landow ner u se s legal weapons, hunts during the seaso n ,
and follows other hunting regulations.
B y patrol during the se a so n , but tags are transferred before the se a so n
M a n a g e m e n t S ta te A gency holds M anagem ent rights over S p e c ie s
E xclusion: S ta te A gency transfers E xclusion rights over S p e c ie s to L an d o w n er
For th e a ttrib u te o f g am e and to the extent th a t the landowner determ ines who has acc e ss to his or her
property
B y patrol, during the term of the agreement
A lienation: S ta te A gency transfers A lienation rights over S p e c ie s to L an d o w n er
For th e a ttrib u te o f g am e and to the extent th a t the landowner can sell tags to other people.
B y patrol, tag s transferred before the hunt
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One transaction is based on attributes of land: a landowner submits a m anagem ent plan
for approval and opens his or her land to som e degree o f public hunting. This gives the state
conservationists proprietary rights to private land.
The other transaction involves game wildlife as the traded good (Table 15). Here, land
owners receive near-complete ownership o f the wildlife, earning rights to hunt and kill, decide
who else can hunt and kill, and choose to transfer these rights to other people. The landowner's
ownership o f w ildlife is limited in kind and exten t H e or she has all levels of ow nership except
management; that is, the landowner cannot add individuals to the population or do anything else
to the population beyond hunting i t Their ownership is limited also by exten t the hunting tags
they buy that give them these rights are good only for the present hunting season.

Private Management
D eseret Land and Livestock and the Peregrine Fund (Table 16) are two exam ples of
agreements between private landowners and conservation agencies by which the landowner is
given the right to manage wildlife.
In the first case, Deseret harbored Bear River Bonneville Cutthroat trout on its property
and w as approached by the Utah Division of Wildlife with the following offer. If Deseret would
restore streams and develop ponds such that the trout w ould have adequate habitat, and would

Table 16. Private Management, A. the case of Deseret Land and Livestock; B.
the c a s e of the Peregrine Fund
SPECIES
Access/Withdrawal
Management
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

Conservationist
X
X

A. D eseret Land and Livestock
A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: State A gency transfers A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over S p e c ie s to L an d o w n er
For the a ttrib u te o f n/a gam e and to the e xte n t th a t landowner can allow catch-and-release fishing for the
sp ecies
B y patrol, during the term of the agreem ent
M a n a g e m e n t L an d o w n er transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to S tate A gency
For the a ttrib u te offish habitat and to the exte nt th a t landowner restores habitat to satisfaction of agency
B y project before trade of other rights
E xclu sio n : L an d o w n er holds E xclusion rights over S p e c ie s
A lienation: S ta te A gency holds A lienation rights over S p ec ie s

B. Peregrine Fund
A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: Federal A gency transfers A cc e ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over S p e cie s to C o n serv atio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f n/a and to the e x te n t th a t the conservationist may hold species in capitivity to rear and
then release individuals
B y patrol over the term of the agreem ent
M a n a g e m e n t F ederal Agency transfers M an agem en t rights over S p e c ie s to C o n serv atio n ist
For the a ttrib u te o f survivability and to the exte nt th a t the conservationists can reintroduce individuals to
depleted or extirpated populations.
B y collaboration on specific projects.
E xclusion: F ed eral A gency holds E xclusion rights over S p e c ie s
A lienation: F ederal A gency holds A lienation rights over S p ec ie s
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allow Utah to draw fish from these ponds tc use as a stocking source, then Utah w ould permit
Deseret to run a commercial catch-and-release fishing business with these rare trout.
By accepting this arrangement, Deseret received access rights to trout to the extent that
their customers could catch and release them. Deseret gave up some rights to manage its land by
following the state's instructions to improve fish habitat. Utah retained rights to m anage the fish
by rem oving or introducing individuals. N ote that Deseret has and retains exclusion rights to the
fish by default because they own the land where the fish is found.
In the second case, the Peregrine Fund is permitted by the federal government to access
endangered birds of prey to the extent that the Fund can hold them captive to rear and release
them back to the wild. The Fund has the right to manage the wildlife in that they feed, house,
and otherwise care for internal functions of the anim al population. The rights of access and
exclusion held by the Fund are defined by the necessity o f allowing it to manage the birds.

Exemption
Experimental Populations and No-take Agreem ents (Table 17) are examples o f how the
federal governm ent has reached voluntary agreements with private people and landowners

1
•i

I
;
s
|
j
I

within the regulations on endangered species m anagem ent I recognize that this is not exactly a
voluntary arrangement given the regulatory nature of the Endangered Species Act, but I include
it as an exam ple of a useful concept
When the red w olf (Canis nifiis) was proposed for reintroduction in North Carolina, the
Fish and W ildlife Service used a provision of the law to write special regulations that w ould
apply only to the red w olves they released into the wild. These rules allowed trappers and
hunters to kill an endangered red w olf by accident. In effect, they transferred access and with
drawal rights to red w olves to the extent that the withdrawal was accidental and that the hunter
or trapper reported the accident within 24 hours.
A more complex version of the same idea is the No-Take Agreement, which is transferred
through a memorandum (Table 18). Here as with an Experimental population, the landowner
receives the right of access and withdrawal o f the endangered species. They receive this right in
exchange for the management rights they transfer to the government in the form of an approved
management plan the landowner agrees to follow.

5
*

s6

|

___________

Table 17. An Exemption, the case of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Red
Wolf Recovery Program
SPECIES
Access/Withdrawal
Management
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X

Consorvatiomst
_ ,
X
X
X
X

A cc e ss a n d W ithdraw al: Federal Agency transfers A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al rights over S p ec ies to trappers
For the a ttrib u te o f vulnerability to traps and to the e xte n t th a t a trapper accidentally captures a red wolf
B y professional determination within 24 hours of the accidental capture
M anagem ent: F ed eral A gency holds M anagem ent rights over S p e c ie s
E xclusion: F ed eral A gency holds Exclusion rights over S p e c ie s
A lienation: F ed eral A gency holds Alienation rights over S p e c ie s
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Table 18. An Exemption, the case of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sen/ice Memo
randa: A. Land-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency; B. De facto
Species-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency; C. Species-rights from
Federal Agency to Landowner
A. Land-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency
LAND
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X
X
X
X

C onservationist
X
W X
»

A cc e ss a n d W ithdraw al: L an d o w n er transfers A c c ess and W ithdraw al rights over L and to Federal A gency
For the a ttrib u te o f n/a and to the extent tha t agency people e n ter the property to handle, monitor, install
equipm ent, exercise m anagem ent rights, and other pertinent activity
B y patrol during term of agreem ent
M an a g e m e n t L an d o w n er transfers M anagem ent rights over Land to F ed e ra l A gency
For the a ttrib u te o f capacity to support a chosen wildife population(s) and to the extent tha t the landowner
follows an approved m anagem ent plan
B y cooperation and patrol, with a review after five years to update the management plan with new law and science.
E xclusion: L an d o w n e r holds E xclusion rights over Land
A lienation: L an d o w n e r holds A lienation rights over Land

B. De facto Species-rights from Landowner to Federal Agency
SPEC IES
Access/W ithdrawal
M anagem ent
Exclusion
Alienation

\

*

Landowner
X
X
X
X

^

Conservationist
X

A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: L an d o w n er transfers A c c e ss and W ithdraw al rights over S p e c ie s to Federal A gency
For the a ttrib u te o f n/a and to the extent tfiatth e landowner grants the agency access to his or her land when
in the com pany of th e Landowner or his or her employee
B y patrol, during term o f the agreement
M anagem ent: L an d o w n e r holds whatever de facto M anagem ent rights over S p e c ie s h e o r she has
E xclusion: L an d o w n er holds whatever de facto Exclusion rights over S p e c ie s h e o r sh e has
A lienation: L an d o w n e r holds whatever de facto Alienation rights over S p e c ie s h e o r sh e has

I

C. Species-rights from Federal Agency to Landowner
SPE CIES
Access/Withdrawal
M an ag em en t
Exclusion
Alienation

Landowner
X

Conservationist
x
X
X
X

A cc e ss a n d W ithdraw al: F ed eral A gency transfers A ccess an d W ithdraw al rights over S p ecies to L an d o w ner
For the a ttrib u te o f vulnerability to land management to the e x te n t th a t m anagem ent modifies habitat or
disrupts behavior of individuals of the species
B y patrol during term of agreem ent
M anagem ent: F ed e ra l A gency holds M anagem ent rights over S p ecies
E xclusion: F ed eral A gency holds E xclusion rights over Sp ecies
A lienation: F ed eral A gency holds A lienation rights over Sp ecies

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73

The No-take Agreem ent highlights a difficulty that has show n up in court: is there a
difference betw een managem ent rights to land and access/ withdrawal rights to wildlife? Manag
ing land affects the habitat value of that land for wildlife, so certain managem ent could destroy
the habitat value and, in effect, kill the w ildlife. The No-take Agreem ent separates these rights by
an agreement on safe management. If the landowner manages safely, then the only infringement
on rights to the species are agreed to be accidental.

Working Together and Voluntary Compliance: the miscellany
These tw o types of agreement represent the fringes of m y typology. There were a num
ber of cases that I cou ld not place in the preceding types, so I review them here (Table 19).
In several cases, voluntary agreements of various types (as described above) were
arranged within the efforts of a larger group. Parties outside the agreem ent were aware of the
agreement and w ere indirectly responsible for it because they shared membership with the
parties in a larger group. For example, many cost-share agreements under the Fish and Wildlife
Service Partners for Wildlife Program were arranged in the Blackfoot Valley o f Montana where
all such activities are coordinated by an umbrella group of citizens and private and governm ent
conservationists called the Blackfoot Challenge. It may be that the environm ent created by the
Blackfoot Challenge m ade the cost-share agreements easier.

i
I

Table 19. Working Together: the miscellany. A. the c a se of the Black Bear
Conservation Committee; B. The Blackfoot Challenge; C. Project SHARE
A. Black Bear Conservation Committee
A c c e ss a n d W ithdraw al: F ederal A gency holds A c c e s s and W ithdrawal rights over S p e c ie s

|

M anagem ent: F ed eral A gency transfers M anagem ent rights over S p e c ie s to group
For the a ttrib u te o f persistence and to the exte nt that the agency institutes the group's plan
B y professional review and publication after the group develops the plan
E xclusion: Federal A g en cy holds E xclusion rights over S pecies
A lienation: F ederal A g en cy holds A lienation rights over S pecies

f

|

B. Blackfoot Challenge

'!
5.

C. Project SHARE (Salmon Habitat and River Enhancem ent)
•j
J

A cce ss a n d W ithdraw al: S ta te A gency transfers A c c e ss and W ithdrawal rights over S p e c ie s to L andow ner
For the a ttrib u te o f reproductive su ccess and to the extent tha t landowner produces fish for stocking
B y collaboration, inspection
M an a g e m e n t S ta te A g en cy transfers M anagem ent rights over S p e cie s to L a n d o w n er
For the a ttrib u te o f reproduction and to the extent that captive fish released
B y collaboration, inspection
E xclusion: S tate A g e n c y holds E xclusion rights over S pecies
A lienation: S tate A g e n cy holds A lienation rights over Species
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In other cases, such as the State of Montana Forestry Best Management Practices Program
(BMP), a group collaborates on rules for land management with which members voluntarily
comply. This is an interesting twist on the management-right scenarios for common-pool re
sources described by Schlager and Ostrum (1993), but I do not know where it fits in my typology.
The BMP group is deciding on rules that will protect som e of the public-good values of land,
which is similar to what the managers, proprietors, and owners do with a common-pool resource.
Unlike these governors of common-pool resources, however, the BMP group cannot require
private landowners to adopt the group's rules. This is done through law, but that is not a volun
tary agreement.

Conclusion
These agreements are reached within the rules of Governmental Conservation, or outside
the rules as in the case o f non-legally binding agreements. To experiment further with these
agreements w ill require the rules of Governmental Conservation to change, at least by granting
experimental authority to local conservationists and landowners. This policy implication is
similar to the one identified by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), who described the need to determine
the local arrangements of coaster fishermen before prescribing policy for managing coastal
fisheries. In that case, the local arrangements preceded the policy. In the case of endangered
species management, the policy preceded the local arrangements. Success in managing endan
gered species by local arrangements, then, depends in part on the our ability to foster these
arrangements under an existing set of policies.
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Dan Pletscher (Director of the Wildlife Biology Program at the University of Montana)

I

and I were driving to Helena, MT, to a discussion about changing the Endangered Species A c t

I

On the drive, Dan asked me to define conservation. I paraphrased a dictionary definition, "to

I
I
«

protect natural resources from unnecessary loss or waste." Dan complained that I left out the idea

1

show negotiation as a big part of conservation, but Dan and I that day were going to a negotiation

I

o f sorts convened by two state legislators who were developing recommendations for changing

|

the Endangered Species A c t In this final chapter I produce not only a more thoughtful definition

I
r
r

for Dan, but also propose a theory of how conservation works.

o f sustainability. Looking back, I see I left out negotiation also. N ot only do my case studies

Conservation Redefined
The cases in my study showed m e that conservation begins with people having an
interest in resources. History shows that when resources fail to satisfy our interests, w e try to
correct the condition of resources. First this was done mainly by brute force am ong market
hunters, landowners, game dealers, and governments. After state and federal laws settled

75
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conservation into a fairly peaceful nation-wide effort of government agencies, the varying
interests in resources grew in number and kind. N ow government is hard pressed to resolve the
differences. Voluntary agreements are local exam ples of individual conservationists and
landowners to resolve these differences. When these negotiators agree, they act together to
protect resources from waste and sustain them. Either on private land or at state, regional, and
federal levels, conservationists reach agreements and act on them. Local conservation usually
results in projects, Iarger-scale conservation usually leads to policies and administration o f public
resources. At any level, interests are negotiated and action taken.
Pulling it all together: conservation is any act that negotiates interests in resources to
reduce waste and sustain desirable conditions.

Types of Negotiations
Negotiations o f interest in resources take 4 forms (Fig. 4). One is the debate of public
interests in the public domain. This is w here state and federal policies are made for air, water,
and public lands. Another is the debate o f public interests on private lands. This is where
regulations are debated for private lands and also where landowners and conservationists reach
|

voluntary agreements. Third is the negotiation o f private interests in public land. Local

*

collaboration (e.g., Project SHARE) and citizen managem ent (e.g., Grizzly Reintroduction (USDI

|

1997)) are exam ples o f how this negotiation is becoming formalized.

|

Com m on to all three negotiations is the trade-off between national and local interests.

|

Stout (1996) described three ways that agencies negotiate their national or regional

'j

responsibilities w ith local people. First, agencies respond to the "squeaky wheels," i.e., those

!3

I

people who call in or visit the agency. Second, agencies systematically describe interests of local

;

people with surveys or similar methods. Third, agencies convene task forces. Voluntary

|

agreements and citizen management are additional tools. When an agency reaches agreement

•

with a landowner, that agreement is intended to carry out the agency mandate just as an agency

1

decision. Likewise, w hen an agency shares its management authority with local people, the

;

decision o f the group serves the role of the agency decision.
H aving looked in detail at agreements of groups (e.g., the Bull Trout Restoration Team

r

and Project SPLARE) and of one-on-one agreem ent (the interviews behind Chapter 4), and having
seen the pyramid as a useful representation of both, I propose that a pyramid also represents the
whole practice o f conservation.
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Fig. 4. Forms of negotiation of interests in resources.
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The Conservation Pyramid
One of the problems with conservation, is a shortage of local arrangements for carrying it
out. Remember Leopold's (1942:295) complaint that conservation focuses on "bureaus, policies,
laws, and programs" rather than "resources, products, and Iand-users"? (see pg. 31) Mangun and
Man gun (1991) argued that because local government has claimed no obvious role in wildlife
conservation, the state and federal bodies dominate. If conservation were described as a
pyramid, it would be precarious, lacking a base. Perhaps the new model of conservation is such a
pyramid with a strong base of voluntary agreements with landowners and state task forces.
Pyramids that describe agreement and collaboration (Fig. 3) build a larger pyramid that
represents conservation (Fig. 5). Just as a biotic pyramid describes functions o f the resources (Fig.
3), a conservation pyramid describes how people arrange conservation. When any level o f a
pyram id is weak or missing, the overall pyramid —either resources or conservation —is
unhealthy. Following this model, w hen w e see defects in the resources pyramid, w e could look to
the conservation pyramid to plan a solution.
In the future, conservation may work as follows. Local conservation is built by a
pyram id-like succession of daily life starting with grapevines and relationships and finishing with
agreem ents that local people put on the ground (Fig. 5). Regulations would remain a part of local
conservation. Based on the best agreements and accomplishments of local people, state and
regional people (e.g.. Project SHARE, Blackfoot Challenge, the Bull Trout Restoration Team)
w ou ld coordinate efforts and reach agreement for practices to cover large areas of public and
private land. Capping the effort w ould be national policies. These policies would be grounded in
the negotiations that lead to reduced waste and sustained conditions in smaller places.

Making It Happen
For conservationists and landowners (or other people) who want to see if the
conservation pyramid can be built, I recommend the following to cultivate the base of local
conservation.

Recognize the Need to Negotiate
It is very difficult to argue that conservation morally trumps uses of resources that
appear to imperil the resources, and it is also hard to define peril. People appeal to great
philosophers, to God, and to utilitarian arguments that we should not foul our own nest, but
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Fig. 5. A conservation pyramid.
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people have many countering moral appeals of their ovvn. There are few practical rejoinders to a
landowning family that wants to violate someone's concept of conservation to earn a short-term
profit to send children to school or pay for medical treatment. Even conservationists disagree on
what is right, usually over risks in managing wildlife. For exam ple, conservationists working to
save the California condor disagreed about the decision to begin a captive breeding program. In
Florida, biologists disagreed on whether to introduce cougars from Texas to supplement the
Florida panther population.
I suggest that conservationists and landowners develop an honest curiosity and concern
for each other's interests. Both are concerned with what the land can produce, even if the
landowner has only a sm all tract with a nice view'. The history o f Iand-use in an area, and the
cultural importance of local resources products would be a good starting place for the
conservationist. The landowner could seek out state or private conservationists to see what they
are tracking on their natural heritage databases.
The m ost valuable skill in recognizing the need to negotiate m ay be listening, but there
are a few things to look for. Active listening (Rogers 1951) is a skill, and can be learned.
Members told me that much of what they hear in the Talking/Listening stage is venting, so the
prospects for agreement m ay seem dim at first. More specifically, learn w hat landowners'
schedules are, and do not drop in on them at inconvenient hours. Learn each other's business
objectives and how business is going. Do not work on your ow n clock alone.

Become Part of Your Community
This is not advice only for conservationists, though they may have a harder time taking it.
Conservation agencies m ove som e employees frequently, and em ployees som etim es cannot or
will not put dow n roots in any of their periodic communities. Employers may need to change
some aspects of their em ployee's jobs to overcome this problem. Landowners also need to
consider this. Several members of a Montana community in m y study described a neighboring
com m unity as "apathetic" because there was less "community spirit" and therefore was a hard
place to spread agreements.
Becoming part o f a community takes time, and trust and credibility are earned. Finding
and m eeting the official and unofficial community leaders appears to be an essential first step.
Members also said that chance encounters in grocery stores and helping neighbors with flat tires,
loose cow s, and other small random projects all help build a person's presence in a community. It
may help conservationists to focus their time in areas small enough to allow them to spend time
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with people. N one o f the members with whom I spoke had experience building a grapevine in
apathetic communities.

Develop Offers
Chapter 3 provides examples and hopefully w ill spark innovations. It seems inevitable
that offers will rely on surrogate attributes and general measures, but improvements in
technology might open new opportunities. Consider starting with a "free sample" offer. This is
any easy agreem ent that gives people experience working together to m eet a conservation
objective, however small it may be. Nest-boxes have been used as "free samples."
Before offering, be sure to know the details of the offer. Field conservationists should
have as much decision-making authority as possible, to allow tailoring of deals without
paperwork and referrals.
Be ready to refer landowners to other conservationists or other landowners if necessary.
When referring people, arrange the meeting yourself and go along with the person you referred.

f
5

Learn to Reach Agreement to Conserve Wildlife on Private Land
My version of an agreement pyramid is only a good start local conservationists and

i

|

landowners should use it experimentally until they learn (or make) the rules for reaching

|

agreem ent in their ow n area. Talking and listening likely is the key. There is a lot of talking in

|

agreements to conserve endangered species and it takes a lot of time. All o f us can reach

|

agreem ent with a grocer on a sack of groceries with barely a word, and even tough negotiations

|

(like labor union agreements) seem to fit some schedule. Agreement seem s to defy scheduling,

I

which may mean that people getting involved in this type of conservation need a flexible concept

?

o f h ow fast or slow things get done. Again, the concept of a pyramid, as an analogy to the biotic

f

pyramid, is that y o u move up w hen the base is sufficient. As good soil w ill not produce as much

I

during a drought, so good talk may not move as quickly to agreement if relationships are strained

\

by circumstances.
After closing a deal, keep in touch and remain available in the community for people
w ho w ill see what you have done and call on you to do it with them.

Feed Ideas to Policy Makers
State governm ent and the state echelons of federal agencies probably will need to change
programs, job descriptions, personnel, and even policy and law as local conservation evolves
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further. Local conservationists and landowners will have necessary suggestions for these
changes. Therefore, local people and area managers should have a way to share ideas.

The Conservation Map
Conservation comprises both social phenom ena (like negotiation) and ecological
phenom ena (like how land responds to projects meant to reduce waste and sustain chosen
conditions). It follows, therefore, that both social and ecological information are helpful to
conservationists. Because conservationists often use maps, those maps could be im proved by
including the social information described by the pyramid model of agreement.
Agreement pyramids can be mapped to show the state of agreements across a region. In
Montana, moderate- to well-developed pyramids can be drawn over the Blackfoot Valley, the Big
Hole Valley, and the Flathead Valley at least. Conservationists and landowners in m y study often
were able to describe not only how far along toward agreements they were in their place, but also
how far along others were in other communities.
Mapping agreement pyramids to correspond with the amount or likelihood o f agreement
w ould a useful element to such mapping tools as Gap Analysis (Scott et al. 1991). The basic idea
i

behind Gap Analysis is to compare land protection schemes with the location of chosen parts or

I

conditions of land under threat. Where threatened land is unprotected, conservationists can

t.

||
P
6

usually describe jurisdictions of agencies or ownerships with conservation easements. By adding

J;

agreement pyramids to maps, a Gap Analysis can sh ow where local conservation efforts are

|
I
I

strong and where they need cultivation.

I

The Last Word

I
j

f-

focus their effort The codes on the map describing land protection are social codes, and they

My study opens two doors to better understanding of conservation: (1) the relationships
between conservationists and landowners; and, (2) the use of qualitative data.
Am ong the questions to be explored about relationships are: What measurable factors, if
any, predict the likelihood of agreement? What are the prices and transaction costs in voluntary
agreements? What is our current inventory of locally-based conservation?
Qualitative research methods enable us to begin answering these questions before w e
have techniques to measure relationships numerically. The scientific approach to these questions
begins as w e collect stories people tell about their experiences. Stories are key facts of evidence
and can be handled as systematically as the study skins collected by early biologists.
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Perhaps gaining the ability to study relationships will change our thinking about what
conservation means. Instead of thinking conservation is harmony between people and the
resources, as Leopold (1949) described it, perhaps w e will see it also as harmony among people.
This not to say, of course, that Leopold's grasp of conservation w as in any w ay dim.
Indeed, no conservationist seems to have thought of anything that had not already occurred to
Aldo Leopold. H e once wrote, "there are two things that interest me: the relation of people to
each other, and the relation of people to land" (M eine 1988:51).
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